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Media and Communications

Summary
Developments in digital technologies over the last 30 years have expanded massively human beings’ capacity to communicate across time and
space (Section 13.1). Media infrastructures have simultaneously acquired huge complexity. By “media” we mean technologies for the production,
dissemination, and reception of communication, but also the contents distributed through those technologies and the institutions associated with
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their production, dissemination, and reception. The relations between media, communications, and social progress are complex. More people
can now make meaning and be connected through media, providing an important resource for new movements for justice and social progress.
Meanwhile the uneven distribution of opportunities to access and use media is itself a dimension of social justice.
Media infrastructures, and media access, have spread unevenly (Section 13.2), and media’s consequences for social progress cannot be determined
at a general level. Traditional and digital media have developed according to distinctive histories across the world (Section 13.2.1), with varying
marketization and state control (case studies on China, Russia, Sweden, South Africa, Indonesia, and Mexico: Section 13.2.2). Inequalities of
access to media infrastructures (Section 13.2.3) are stark, between and within regions and inside countries, with implications for the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). Cultural flows through media vary greatly within and between regions (Section 13.2.4).
Meanwhile (Section 13.2.5) people’s increasing dependence on an online infrastructure that mediates daily life increases the importance of the
corporations, which provide that infrastructure. This has transformed the governance of media infrastructures (Section 13.3), with a shift from
formal to informal governance and the growing importance of transnational governance institutions and practices, whereby corporations, not
states, exercise predominant influence (Section 13.3.2), including through the operations of algorithms, with ambiguous implications for corporate power and individual rights, for the public sphere and for social progress (Section 13.3.3).
Journalism has for centuries been a key institutional form for disseminating public knowledge, and so contributing to social progress (Section 13.4).
While digital technologies have expanded who can do journalism (see Section 13.4.5 on citizens’ media), other aspects of digitization have
undermined the economics of public journalism (Section 13.4.3), with new threats to journalists from growing political instability (Section 13.4.4).
Even so, there are new voices within global journalism (see Section 13.4.6 on TeleSUR and Al-Jazeera).
The increasing networking of communications changes citizenship too, as citizens find information, develop imaginative loyalties and make
practical connections beyond national borders, not only within the Global North (Section 13.5) and with particular implications for global youth
(Section 13.5.2). A more “connected” life is, however, not simply “better” (see Section 13.5.3’s case study of life in a Chinese heritage village and
Section 13.5.4 on the media-based oppression and resistance of precarious workers in East Asia).
Struggles for social justice through the democratization of media (Section 13.6) have acquired new prominence, echoing previous struggles (Section 13.6.1)
and foregrounding the transparency and accountability of media infrastructures, and data flows in particular, (Section 13.6.2), with implications for the
SDGs and Social Progress Index (SPI). Concerns include net neutrality, internet freedom, algorithms’ discriminatory operations, and the automated surveillance on which most online businesses now rely. There are implications for state and corporate power (Section 13.6.5), which civil society has challenged
(Section 13.6.4 on India and Facebook’s Free Basics). A bold new model of internet governance has emerged in Brazil (Section 13.6.6 on Marco Civil).
Yet media remain the channel through which many struggles for social progress are pursued (Section 13.7). An important example of innovative
media use for social progress was the Zapatistas in Mexico (Section 13.7.1), but social movements’ uses of media technologies have taken many
forms across the world, exposing important constraints (Section 13.7.2). Since old media generally do not disappear but are linked up in new ways
through digital media, it is overall ecologies of media resource on which movements that struggle for social progress have drawn (Section 13.7.3),
with struggles against the injustices faced by disabled people being an example of the creative use of media resources (Section 13.7.4).

Effective access to media is a necessary component of social justice (Section 13.8). But media’s consequences for social progress are complicated by
uneven media access, the plurality of spaces where people connect through media, and the multiple uses of communication resources (hate speech
is enabled by the Internet too). The SPI should measure the distribution of opportunities for effective media access and use, and address communication rights. Media infrastructures are a common good whose governance should be open to democratic participation. Concerns about automated
surveillance and the environmental costs of digital waste must also be addressed. Our action plan and toolkit list various measures to these ends.
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Chapter 13

13.1 Introduction: Media Infrastructures
and Communication Flows

produced in other places. This has generated unprecedented cross-
border connection, dialogue, and solidarity.

Media’s role in social change, and potentially social progress, is often
assumed, rather than fully investigated. “Media” are inherently complex, in themselves and in their consequences. By “media” we mean
primarily technologies for the production, dissemination, and reception
of communications, but (in accordance with the common usage of the
word “media” and its equivalents in many languages) we include also
contents distributed through those technologies and the institutions
associated with their production, dissemination, and reception. By
“social progress,” we refer to the development of societies towards the
progressive enablement of human beings to fulfil their needs and capabilities (Sen 1999; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009; compare the Social
Progress Index [Porter and Stern 2015], especially “Access to information and communication”). The consequences of media for social progress can be approached from many angles. Our main emphasis will
be on media as providers of content and infrastructures of connection,
since these are media’s most important aspects for social progress.

However, the basic patterns underlying contemporary media flows have
much earlier origins. From the birth of the press through the development of postal, telephone, radio, and television networks, media flows
and infrastructures have been crucial to successive modern forms of
citizenship, providing information about governments and markets,
connecting national populations and economies, providing forums
for citizen practice and underpinning national identity (Anderson
1983). Media flows and infrastructures have also played central roles
in projects of political and economic domination, providing the information necessary to govern empires, manage enterprises, and control
populations. But media’s spread across the world has been uneven, as
Section 13.2 explains.

13.1.1 Media as Infrastructures of Connection
Developments in media technologies over the past three decades have
expanded massively the capacity of human beings and automated
systems to create, use, disseminate, and store information and content of all types across time and space. This has happened through
the emergence of the Internet, the digitization of previously analogue
content, and the development of new platforms and devices. Changes
have come so fast that it is easy to forget the much longer history of
media’s role in the formation of modern societies, polities, and economies. In this chapter we seek to recognize that longer history, while
also reflecting upon the dramatic nature of media’s transformations
over the past three decades.
Media inherently involve the production, sharing, and interpretation of
meanings, and so media processes are always contestable and open
to further interpretation. Yet media remain at the same time infrastructure: networks of interdependencies that enable social, political,
and economic action, but also encode both cultural and technological
constraints. This double role of media, as both meaning and infrastructure (Boczkowski and Siles 2014; Sewell 2005), requires investigating both media cultures –what users and audiences do with the
media, their “media-related practices” (Couldry 2012) –and media
affordances: how media infrastructures shape the range of possible
uses available to everyday users and audiences.

13.1.2 Media as Enablers of Increasing
Cultural Complexity
Media infrastructures have acquired a particular complexity and reach
in the past three decades due to the global but uneven spread of the
Internet and social media platforms. Globalization has distributed flows
of meaning more transnationally than before. Mundane exposure to
media images and messages that flow from other parts of the world
encourages people to become more reflexively open to the meanings
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Despite increasing convergence of platforms for media delivery, proliferating media flows, and infrastructures have produced cultural
complexity and increased the possibilities for cultural contestation,
within and across national borders (Hannerz 1992; Iwabuchi 2002).
Imagined communities, sustained by media, now proliferate involving,
for example, marginalized people, diasporic communities, and political activists. Digital media have also enabled more people to become
active producers and disseminators of images and meanings. This
expanded productivity of meaning through media has itself become a
practical precondition for new movements for social progress.

13.1.3 The Social Justice Issues Raised by Media
and Communications
Through media, individuals and groups have more cultural resources
with which to interpret and challenge cultural forms. Such access
enriches the modalities of political action and protest, with
consequences for social change and social progress (relevant SPI
indicators are “Personal rights” and “Personal freedom and choice”).4
The political struggles against slavery in the nineteenth century and for
the civil rights of all ethnic groups in the late twentieth century were
also cultural struggles that drew on contemporary media resources.
But because media impact is always contestable, the consequences
of media practice and media innovations for social progress cannot
be determined at a general level. Media globalization has both
engendered indifference and disparity of attention and promoted
dialogue and solidarity. Media and communications’ contribution to
social progress must always be considered at more specific levels.
Nonetheless, since connection is important to people’s possibilities of
action, the uneven distribution of opportunities to access media and
use them effectively is a dimension of social justice in its own right.
Improved “access to information and communications technology,”
including “universal affordable access to the Internet” by 2020, is
rightly a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 9.c),5 but it raises fundamental social justice issues too. First, media are a key resource that
enables the “reality” of particular social and political territories to be
4
5

The SPI report is found in Porter and Stern (2015).
The SDGs are found in United Nations (2015).
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framed one way rather than another; as a result, media, through their
operations, can perpetrate specific “injustices [in] framing” (Fraser
2005: 79) the social world. Second, because media have the symbolic power to construct general realities, media institutions comprise
a resource whose long-term distribution can be unjust. Some battles
for social progress contest particular media representations; others
challenge media institutions’ general control over symbolic power.
In still other cases, media provide a forum for challenging injustices
unconnected with media.
The relations between media, communications, and social progress are
therefore inherently complex. Measures of social progress (such as the
SPI) require considerable adjustment if they are to fully take account
of media’s contribution to social progress: measures of technological
access alone are insufficient. Nor (see Section 13.2) is there a common
pattern to how media institutions “work” in societies across the world.
Even so, media and communications have important potential to contribute to particular struggles for social justice.

13.1.4 Media, Communications, and the Longer Global
Struggle for Media Reform
Now is not the first time that the implications of media flows and
infrastructures for social progress have been considered on a global
scale. Such questions were central to the MacBride Report prepared
for UNESCO in 1980 (Many Voices, One World), which followed two
decades of contested debate about “development.” The report proposed
a New World Information and Communication Order (“NWICO”) and
challenged the assumption that a global media infrastructure dominated
by “the West” was good for democracy, social order and human rights.
But the MacBride Report’s proposals were not implemented, and a
recent attempt to revive their broad agenda (the World Summit on the
Information Society in 2003) has also achieved only limited success.6
The history of “media reform” on a global scale is an interrupted one
(MacBride and Roach 1989), which we discuss more fully in Section 13.6.
Meanwhile, the relations between media and capitalist accumulation
(Jin 2015; Schiller 1999) become ever more complex, and new market-
based media infrastructures –for example, social media platforms and
the vast infrastructures of data extraction on which they rely –pose
increasingly urgent questions for social life and democratic practice.

13.2 Media Industries from Print to the Internet
This section introduces the diversity and unevenness of media
infrastructures, media access, and media’s cultural dynamics across
the world. As such, it provides the reference point for later discussions
of contemporary forms of communication inequality and opportunities for, or threats to, public knowledge (Sections 13.3 and 13.4) and
the emergence of new spaces for citizenship (Section 13.5) and the
long history of struggles for “democratization of media” and “democratization through media” (Zhao and Hackett 2005) (Sections 13.6
and 13.7).
6
7

For a reassessment, see WSIS Civil Society Plenary (2003).
Material on Russia in this case study written by Olessia Koltsova.

Media and Communications

13.2.1 Traditional Media and the Internet as
Infrastructures of Connection
Policy discourses about media have been dominated by the histories of
how “modern” media (newspapers, radio, television, film) developed
in Western Europe and North America. While scholarship on the complex regional flows of media has challenged the dominance of Western
history (Boyd-Barrett 1977; Iwabuchi 2007; Schiller 1969; Sinclair and
Jacka 1996), the same geographical skewing has been repeated in
recent accounts of the rise of the Internet (Chan 2013). We will argue
against this simplified view.
No universal history of media is possible on a global scale. Today’s
uneven global media landscape reflects many diverse histories: the
contrasting reliance on public service versus commercial models
of broadcasting in European and North American media systems;
major linguistic and institutional diversity in Australasia and the
Pacific; the contrasting roles played by state and market in India
versus China; the super-fast growth of online connectivity in North-
East Asian economies dominated by Chaebols (family-owned
multinationals in South Korea); the contrasting legacies of colonialism in media development in Africa and Latin America; the distinctive role played by Gulf petro-monarchies in the Arab region’s
media. There are many possible relations between media, state,
market, and society, each shaped differently by geopolitical forces,
which rule out a universal narrative of “media and social progress.”
In what follows we present case studies from different regions to
underscore not only media’s diversity at a national level, but also
how variously media and communication systems intersect to generate resources for social progress. Further case studies are added
in later sections (Sections 13.4 and 13.6).

13.2.2 Case Studies
13.2.2.1

Country Case Study 1: China/Russia7

Today, Russia and China have large media systems that are highly
distinctive in that, while incorporating various market features, they
trace their historical origins to twentieth-
century state-
controlled
non-commercial media systems, whose organization had intellectual
roots in Marxist-Leninist critiques of capitalist and imperialist control
of the media in the West. As such, both systems share the legacy of
today’s “social movement media,” but are also internally complex and
marked by nationalistic and sectorial struggles. Indeed, the Chinese
system had distinctive differences from the Soviet model and by the
early 1960s, the Soviet and Chinese media systems were in serious
ideological conflict. By the late 1960s, the Chinese media system was
destabilized in the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, what
these historical systems had in common was their communist visions
of achieving social progress through ideological mobilization and cultural enfranchisement. This vision provided many Third World postcolonial states with alternative models for media organization from
those in the West while also providing inspiration for social struggles
in the West, including US civil rights struggles (Dudziak 2000; Frazier
2015). However, bureaucratic ossification, and other forms of political, social, and cultural repression, as well as the influence of Western

526
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 16 Sep 2019 at 22:52:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399647.006

527

Media and Communications

media, contributed to the transformations of China’s and Russia’s
media systems from the early 1980s.
The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with a television-centered
noncommercial media system. Liberalization, fractionalization of the
postcommunist political elite, and economic difficulties led to privatization of state TV channels in the mid-1990s. Newly founded private
television channels emerged as the economic situation improved,
bringing more diversity into the media landscape. However, the early
years of the twenty-first century have seen a gradual renationalization of most leading TV channels, outside the entertainment sector.
The Russian government inherited from its Soviet predecessor direct
control over transmission networks and appointment of the top
television management. While the 1990s saw media wars between
different television channels representing various political groups,
the 2000s were marked by emergence of an identical pro-Kremlin
picture on most TV channels. Social and media development is,
however, very uneven across Russian provinces, varying from near
subsistence farmers (with access to just 2–3 analogue TV channels
and no Internet) to highly networked and cosmopolitan major cities.
The government’s television-based policy of media control is more
effective in poorer, less connected regions. While the authorities have
allowed a few oppositional media outlets (TV Dojd’ [Rain] on the
Internet; RBC [RosBusinessConsulting] on cable and satellite; Ekho
Moskvy [Echo of Moscow] on the radio), they have very little influence on public opinion. On a global scale, given the denial for two
decades to Russian television of broadcasting frequencies in most
post-Soviet countries, the government launched Russia Today as a
news provider, which is rapidly emerging as a major transnational
satellite channel.

Chapter 13

China’s economic growth and rapid industrial expansion, China’s print
and broadcasting media industries are both larger and more highly
developed, and more tightly integrated and centrally controlled than
Russia’s. By mid-2015, China had over 2,000 newspaper titles, nearly
10,000 periodicals, more than 300 television stations with nearly 3,000
channels, with an audience reach of 1.35 billion. However, following
nearly four decades of state-directed commercialization, market consolidation, global integration, and digital convergence, China’s media
also bear the hallmarks of market-driven systems familiar in other
parts of the world.

13

At the core of China’s media and communications infrastructure
are state-
controlled media and communications conglomerations
organized at national and provincial levels, including Xinhua News
Agency, People’s Daily Group, CCTV, China National Radio and China
Radio International, and state-owned telecommunication providers
such as China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom. Regional
media conglomerates such as Shanghai Media and Entertainment
Group, Guangdong Nanfang Media Group, and Hunan Satellite
Television have also been highly influential in spearheading institutional reform, operational innovations, and content diversification.
While state control, political direction, and censorship remain an
enduring issue for China’s media professional strata and citizens, particularly in relation to social media platforms, some outlets such as
CCTV’s well-known prime time investigative show Focus Interviews
have played a significant role in spearheading social reforms.
Since the late 1990s, the Chinese state has systematically aimed to
build the size and strength of its media and communication operations.
Targeted national initiatives such as the “connecting every village”
project have significantly improved access in China’s remote areas,
making China’s media and communication infrastructure one of the
most advanced in the Global South. At the same time, as part of the
Chinese state’s effort to address long-standing imbalances in global
communication and promote its own vision of “globalization,” it has
systematically expanded the reach of its media and communication
industries, with CCTV establishing branches in North America and
Africa, and China Telecom and China Mobile expanding globally. The
Chinese state’s persistent effort to control the “commanding heights”
of converging media and communication industries, regulate global
media and communication flows, manage private and foreign capital investments, and pursue the latest technological innovations,
has had a huge impact on the system’s evolving structure and values
(Hong 2017).

Against the trend of most other Russian industries, the Russian internet
industry has been very successful. Russia is the only country where
local internet businesses have beaten global giants without any protective barriers, with Yandex search engine more popular in Russia than
Google, while Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki social networking sites are
attracting much larger local audiences than Facebook. Nevertheless,
the Russian government is facing a challenging choice with regard to
internet management. It has been eager to make the Internet a “locomotive” for the rest of the Russian economy, but this risks disrupting
the vision promoted by the government’s continued control of
Russian television, since government control of the Internet is weaker.
Attempts to increase internet control through pro-government ownership of Russian social media sites such as LiveJournal and VKontakte
might drive a key segment of the news reading internet audience to
foreign competitors such as Facebook. The Russian government has
developed three main tactics: gaining ownership over online media;
producing its own “user-generated content”; and blocking websites.
The result has been a dramatic polarization of Russian audiences
between a loyal majority and a critical minority both online and offline. This policy coupled with state support of internet-based creativity,
has encouraged the Russian IT sector to move away from politically
sensitive issues.

China’s framework for developing its media and communications
infrastructure does not therefore fit with the dominant Western liberal framework that treats press freedom (and “internet freedom”),
defined always as freedom from government control, as the precondition of social progress. Each framework is explained by its distinctive
historical and geopolitical context: accordingly, the more the Chinese
media system evolves, the more the Communist Party of China seeks
to emphasize its Leninist founding principles.

China’s post-1980 media system has developed very differently from
the Russian system. China’s media system retains its overall Leninist
structure and core organizational principles, yet through post-Mao

Since the early 1990s, the Chinese state has mounted an all-out effort
for information technology development through various “golden
projects” to integrate network applications with Chinese politics,
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economy, and society. In the aftermath of the 2008 global economic
crisis, the Chinese state elevated the media, communication, internet,
and cultural industries as a driver of economic restructuring (Hong
2017). In early 2015, Premier Li Keqiang unveiled the Chinese state’s
“Internet Plus Action Plan” to stimulate economic growth by integrating mobile internet, cloud computing, big data, and the “Internet
of Things” with modern manufacturing. No other issue has received
as much strategic emphasis by consecutive Chinese leaderships in
the past three decades. By the time China-based internet firm Alibaba
made a record-setting stock market debut in New York in 2014, China
had established itself as the world’s largest internet market in terms
of the number of users, and in December 2015 China’s internet population was 688 million –just over half of the national population
(China Internet Network Information Center 2016). Yet in this project of making China into “a cyber power,” the Chinese state treats
citizen access and government control as not opposed, but indissolubly
linked (Xinhua 2014). Meanwhile, various sectors of Chinese society
have enthusiastically embraced the Internet (as less tightly controlled
than the traditional media), turning it into a new terrain of discursive
struggles over China’s future.
These developments challenge any simplistic “state versus civil society”
reading of how the Internet contributes to social progress: both the
Chinese state and Chinese society have been empowered through the
Internet (Zhang and Zheng 2012), with outcomes significantly different
from the parallel history of media in Russia.

Media and Communications

Since the late 1990s Sweden has witnessed a tight horizontal integration of the media sector, with companies formerly working within
one media developing tie-
ins or purchasing companies in other
markets: Sweden’s largest media house Bonnier, a book publisher
in the nineteenth century, moved early into publishing newspapers
and weekly/monthly magazines, and today owns television, cinemas,
advertising, and social marketing outlets. The development of “media
houses,” with particular regions’ media being largely controlled by
local or regional media houses, has also undermined the press subsidy
system, undermining political variety in spite of continued state subsidy (Nygren and Zuiderveld 2011).
The digitization of media contents in particular has changed the power
dynamics within the media industries, with the telecommunications
industries acquiring increased importance because of their centrality
to Wi-Fi and broadband networks. This infrastructural power was
highlighted in 2016, when TeliaSonera closed an exclusive deal with
Facebook for free surfing through their networks, perceived as unfair
competition by Swedish news publishers in print and broadcasting and
contrary to the EU regulation on net neutrality (compare Section 13.6.4
on Facebook India).8
Because of its well-developed infrastructure for high-speed internet,
Sweden is also known as a safe haven for internet piracy, with The
Pirate Bay party –its most prominent symbol (Andersson Schwarz
2013; Larsson 2013) –acting as a focus for debates on media governance issues.

13.2.2.2 Country Case Study 2: Sweden
13.2.2.3
In contrast to government-controlled media regimes, Sweden’s media
is shaped by a welfare state system and characterized by a distinctive relation between media and state, market and civil society.
Traditionally, Sweden has had high voter turnout, and high levels of
media and information literacy, not least due to the national subsidy
system for print newspapers, which have resulted in a plurality of
local newspapers with high readership. Typically, the subsidy system
provided for a plurality of political positions, with at least two local or
regional newspapers representing two political viewpoints. Like other
European countries, Sweden has had a strong public service broadcaster for radio and TV, which since the late 1980s has faced strong
competition from commercial broadcasters. The communications infrastructure has been well developed, with high penetrations of landline
phones, mobile phones, and computers.
The development of Sweden’s news media has followed a similar
pattern as other north European countries, with weakening public service media (due to audiences migrating to commercial channels), and
a drift within the press from a focus on opinion formation to a closer
tracking of market demand (Weibull 2016). Newspapers are today
facing dramatic declines in readership, and advertising has migrated
to the Internet. News consumption has also migrated from traditional
press to social media such as Facebook and Twitter. This shift has
challenged Sweden’s distinctive relations between media and wider
society.
8

Country Case Study 3: South Africa

South African media are arguably the most technologically advanced
on the African continent, offering a wide range of content across
print, broadcast, and digital platforms. Its media landscape involves
a three-tiered model of public, commercial, and community media.
South Africa became a democracy in 1994, with its early period post-
independence from Britain (1961) better seen as the continuation of
colonialism in internal form (the apartheid system) (Visser 1997). But
in many ways the country’s media show similarities with those elsewhere on the continent, where colonialism, the postcolonial transition,
and globalization have shaped media systems.
The changes that South African public broadcasting has undergone
illustrate some of these shifts. As in other African countries under military or one-party state rule, the South African Broadcasting Corporation
(SABC) under apartheid acted as a state broadcaster. In 1991, the
Windhoek Declaration, which was put together by independent African
journalists and endorsed by UNESCO, initiated a move to greater
freedom, pluralism, and independence as regards print media. This was
followed 10 years later by the African Charter on Broadcasting, which
created momentum for private, public, and community broadcasting.
The Windhoek Declaration signaled a move towards greater independence of broadcasting continent-wide, even if in some countries like
Zimbabwe there has been a deterioration in recent years (Kupe 2016).
The Windhoek Declaration coincided with the period of negotiated

SVT Opinion, May 2, 2016. www.svt.se/opinion/telias-uppgorelse-med-facebook-ett-slag-mot-svenska-medieforetag.
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transition in South Africa, which saw the SABC adopting a public service mandate and media freedom entrenched in the new Constitution.
The SABC has, however, never been fully publicly funded, and is largely
dependent on commercial funding (Kupe 2014: 29). As in other African
countries, the SABC has recently seen a “push-back” from government
(Kupe 2016): some argue its editorial independence has eroded under
pressure from an ANC government increasingly intolerant of media
criticism. Other negative signs have been the proposal of a statutory Media Appeals Tribunal that would impose harsher sanctions on
offending journalists, and the Protection of State Information Bill that
could criminalize whistleblowers, investigative journalists, and civil
society activists who access information classified by government as
secret (R2K 2015).
South Africa led the way in newspaper development in Anglophone
Africa, with the publication of the Cape Town Gazette in 1800 (Karikari
2007:13), and a centuries-old private commercial press. Under apartheid, mainstream newspapers either supported the regime (the
Afrikaans-language press) or provided a limited critique (the English
press), while an alternative, underground press engaged in a more
radical critique of apartheid and faced harassment, censure, and
closures. Democratization largely eliminated the parallelism between
language and political orientation, and most South African newspapers
adopted a watchdog approach to the government and reflected a liberal, commercial consensus.
Meanwhile, South African media have been affected by global investment processes. The South African press was a major capitalist venture from its inception. For example, the South African media company
Naspers has become a globalized conglomerate, while the Irish
Independent group bought the largest English-language newspaper
group in 1994, selling it in 2013 to the Sekunjalo consortium, in which
Chinese business interests have a major stake. Widely seen as a vehicle
for soft power in Africa, several state-owned Chinese media houses
have offices on the continent (Kenya as well as South Africa), including
the news agency Xinhua, the newspaper China Daily, China Central
Television, and China Radio International. China has also funded
Africa’s media and communications infrastructure (Wu 2012). The
influence of the Chinese media presence and investments in African
media on journalistic norms and practices has been controversial, and
challenges any simple regional or Western-dominated model of media
diversity.
During the transition to democracy, a particular attempt was made to
strengthen the community media sector through the establishment of
the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) to fund media
owned and controlled by the community they serve, especially to enable
more Black ownership of media (Banda 2006). Another important
development has been the rise of popular tabloid newspapers, which,
although commercially owned, provide perspectives from the poor,
mostly Black, working class rarely found in mainstream print media
(Wasserman 2010). Some of the most interesting alternatives to the
mainstream print media in South Africa have been online (the Daily
Maverick, The Con and Groundup). Such publications have provided
critical analysis and investigative reporting often surpassing the
mainstream press in South Africa in diversity and depth. Despite
the obstacles in terms of access and reach, digital media platforms
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are increasingly reshaping social relationships and public spheres in
Africa (Mabweazara 2015: 2). Meanwhile, the mobile phone has had
a massive impact as a platform for Internet access, for reconstituting
traditional modes of sociality (Mabweazara 2015: 2–3), and, via social
media platforms, providing spaces for citizens to engage in political
debate and mobilize for social change.

13
13.2.2.4

Country Case Study 4: Indonesia9

An important case of a diverse media system is Indonesia, the largest economy in Southeast Asia with a population of 240 million,
and the fourth largest democracy in the world. The establishment
of Indonesia’s modern media system owes greatly to the legacies of
President Soeharto’s five-year economic development plans, which
centralized capital and inhabitants in Java. For decades the authoritarian state held strong control over media infrastructure and content,
from the press, radio, film, satellite, to television. The media system was
built to support state developmentalism, limiting civilians to accessing
information provided by the state.
During the 1960s–1980s, Indonesia had a single, state broadcasting
system, Television of the Republic of Indonesia. Although designed as a
network system, television infrastructure and production relied heavily
on central funding and programming (Sen and Hill 2000). The state-
controlled television system shifted to an open, privatized, and more
liberal system in the late 1980s as a consequence of the government’s
open market and open sky policy. These policies allowed foreign content via satellite television and cable networks (Hollander, d’Haenens,
and Bardoel 2009), which catered to the needs of the expanding urban
middle class. By the early 1990s, dozens of private television stations
had been founded, owned by the President’s close allies. This gave
precedence to market demand over commercial news, and gradually
weakened state control over information. Around the same time, the
Internet came to Indonesia, providing an alternative source of information to a small elite in Java (Lim 2003; Sen and Hill 2000). Media
liberalization and commercialization of information paved way for the
growth of a civil society (Hill and Sen 2005; Hollander et al. 2009),
which was the prelude to Indonesia’s transition towards democracy.
The authoritarian regime finally broke under the weight of the Asian
economic crisis of 1997, in the face of increasing public pressure and
conflicting interests within the ruling elite, starting a social transformation among an expanding middle class amid conditions of unprecedented economic growth (Basri 2012). While market demand over
commercial news had helped the push for democratic transition, since
the early 2000s the development of the news media in Indonesia have
relied more on market responses rather than having an independent
democratic agenda (see Lim 2011). Television is Indonesia’s most
popular media with a penetration rate of 97 percent (Nielsen 2014),
and it continues to attract the dominant share of advertising income.
Second to television, the Internet has the highest penetration rate of
34.9 percent in 2014 (APJII 2015) or 88 million users to 51.8 percent in
2016 (APJII 2016). Nielsen (2014) estimated that 48 percent of mobile
9

Case study written by Inaya Rakhmani.

529
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 16 Sep 2019 at 22:52:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399647.006

530

531

Chapter 13

13

phone owners use their phones to access the Internet. This has caused
the closing of print versions of newspapers, while digital news has seen
a steady rise. Over two decades, Indonesia’s media have seen a convergence whereby established media companies, initially specialized
in one form of media –print, television, or online –are expanding into
other media, forming larger, multiplatform converged conglomerates
(Tapsell 2015). Indonesia experienced the largest number of mergers
and acquisitions in the history of its media system in 2011 (Nugroho,
Putri, and Laksmi 2012), establishing four large media conglomerates,
namely MNC Group, Jawa Pos Group, Kompas Gramedia Group, and
Mahaka Group (Lim 2012). There has emerged a set of interconnected
relationships between politicians and media proprietors, with various
political leaders owning media companies. The CEO of MNC Group,
Hary Tanoesoedibjo, founded and heads the political party Perindo, and
ran for vice president of Indonesia in 2015. MNC Group owns three
terrestrial television stations, one pay television station with 60 percent of market share, 14 local television stations, one newspaper, one
online news portal, and several franchise magazines. This has allowed
media conglomerates to republish the same news content on multiple
platforms.
Significantly, the Internet infrastructure and service provision remain
dominated by state enterprises Telkom and Indosat, which cater mostly
to urban users in large cities. Media markets and conglomeration are
concentrated in Jakarta and Java more broadly, monetizing the activities of internet users in large cities while excluding users in rural areas
and small cities. Only 20 percent of women in Indonesia have internet
access (World Wide Web Foundation 2016), which calls for new ways
for inclusive approaches that are gender-informed (see Triastuti 2014).
International forces are important too: in 2015, 70 percent of digital
advertising revenue in Indonesia (USD 560 million) went directly to
Google and Facebook, rather than national companies. Consequently,
media systems in Indonesia today still reflect the centralization model
that was established since the 1960s, while also registering the power
of global digital platforms.

13.2.2.5 Country Case Study 5: Mexico10
The media system in Mexico is highly concentrated and deeply
marketized. Its core is commercial broadcasting, owned by private
corporations controlled by a handful of individuals. The power of those
media corporations was built from alliances between powerful economic groups aligned with government interests that have benefited
from discretionary grants, television and radio concessions, lucrative
contracts for governmental advertising in print media, and ad hoc
legislation (or lack of it) in favor of the sector’s economic interests.
After the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) the country adopted a capitalist economic model and initiated a corporatization of the Mexican
State. From 1929 to 2000 all presidents were members of the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Lack of regulation and communication policies led to a concentration of media in a few families. In the
early twentieth century, well-established industrial families (railways,
mining, and banking) invested in radio broadcasting. After the First
10
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World War, US capital replaced European investments in Mexico, with
large investments in the radio industry (radio stations, manufacture
and sales of radio devices, records, phonographs). Today there are
1,600 radio stations, but 80 percent of them are owned by 13 commercial families.
In 1950 the Mexican television industry started, modeled on the US
commercial system. The families who owned radio stations became,
in turn, the owners of television stations, for example, the Azcárraga
family, which, from its original concession of Channel 2, grew through
mergers to create the now better known Televisa (Televisión Vía
Satélite). From 1972 to 1993 Televisa was Mexico’s only private television company, competing with three public television channels. From its
origins, Televisa had a close link with the ruling party PRI. Televisa subsequently became the most influential global producer and distributer
of Spanish-language audiovisual contents, and currently owns free-
to-air television channels, restricted television systems (satellite and
cable), a leading Spanish editorial house, radio stations, entertainment
companies, soccer teams and stadiums, music recording companies,
and cinema distribution companies. In the early 1990s the public television channels 7 and 13 were privatized. The Salinas Pliego family
(owners of departmental stores and previously radio manufacturers)
bought both channels and created Televisión Azteca offering contents
similar to those of Televisa and aligning itself with the government.
The early 1990s also saw the privatization of telecommunications, generating another monopoly (Telmex-Telcel) in the hands of just one individual, Carlos Slim. Slim’s monopoly started with landline telephone
services (Telmex has 65 percent of the national market) and moved on
to mobile telephony (Telcel has 65 percent of subscribers) and internet
services (75 percent of subscribers). The government justified the sale
of the nation’s telephone company to a single owner by arguing that
a monopoly would scale economies, lower costs, and increase the
number of landlines. However, Mexico’s mobile phone and internet
service costs are actually in the middle of international rankings
(International Telecommunications Union 2014), and, although, since
the early 2000s, internet home users have grown from 5 percent to
61 percent of the population, the digital divide between urban and
rural areas has widened.
Political reforms have continuously supported deregulation and privatization, and changes in legislation have meant more power and
influence for media monopolies, generating a mediacracy, where
members of senate and congress have direct links with the media
industry. In 2012 the PRI party regained the presidency of Mexico,
with Enrique Peña Nieto elected with the full support of the media
industry, mainly Televisa. In 2013 Peña Nieto promoted a historic
constitutional reform in telecommunications and broadcasting with
the aim to increase competition in the sector. The new legislation
enabled Televisa to enter the telecommunications market by offering
triple play services (cable television, landline telephone services, and
the Internet). Televisa now controls the market of restricted television (cable and satellite) with 60 percent of subscribers and in 2014
and 2015 purchased two new cable companies. The new legislation
punishes Telmex by imposing strict restrictions on telephone carriers
(cancellation of long distance fees; a prohibition on charging for interconnection services).
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There are also positive aspects to this new legislation. While public services are still offered by private entities through concessions regimes
that distinguish between commercial, public, and social media (indigenous and cultural), with the latter not allowed to sell advertisements
(previously community and indigenous media were not recognized, and
so operated outside any legal framework), telecommunications and
broadcasting have now been defined as fundamental human rights and
public services (compare SDG 9.c). As for telecommunications, the new
legislation reserves a portion of the spectrum for social concessions,
reflecting the work done by the community cellular network in creating a network of mobile phone services for indigenous communities
previously denied mobile phone services by the major telecommunication companies. Civil society activism in Mexico has begun slowly to
correct for some of the excesses of previous marketization.
* * * * *
The section has introduced the diversity of the world’s media systems
and their organization: state, market, and civil society may work in isolation or together in multiple combinations, with varying consequences
for how media and communications outputs provide a context for
social progress and struggles for social justice.

13.2.3 Unevenness of Access
The stark differences in access to media between population sectors
may have consequences for social progress. It is significant that basic
levels of mobile phone subscriptions and internet access are included
as items in the SPI, alongside concerns about state control of media
registered in the press freedom index (compare SDG 9.c).

Effective media access depends on the interrelationship between
media and other closely related factors: literacy, language, and education (SDG 4). This is the central lesson from the “digital divide”
debate: that simple availability of technology is not sufficient for development or social progress. Empowerment of people through Media
and Information Literacy is an important prerequisite for fostering
equitable access to information and knowledge and promoting free,
independent, and pluralistic media and information systems (UNESCO
2013). Adequate levels of media use require training and education,
democratic participation, accessibility of formats and technology for
people with disabilities and other distinctive needs, diverse content in
appropriate languages, freedom of expression, and opportunities for
community and citizen-produced media. The 2005 Tunis Agenda for
The Information Society acknowledged these factors, and they have
since been the focus of international efforts (WSIS 2005). The multifaceted nature of “access” is crucial to understanding media’s integral role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, and broader
social progress (International Telecommunications Union 2016) (SPI
“Access to information and communications”).
Globally, there has been progress on access to internet and mobile
phones in the past 20 years (SPI “Access to information and
communications”; “Mobile telephone subscriptions”). However,
what such broad indicators of “access” mean on the ground is poorly
understood: much depends on what kinds of media, internet, and
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mobile content people can affordably access. What media access do
people need as the minimum for a “universal” service? Without closer
attention to these questions, today’s push to ever-greater digital connectivity only risks deepening digital exclusion.
There are regions with highly uneven media access. Asia, for instance,
includes countries such as South Korea and Japan, both pioneers in
digital media, as well as emerging powerhouses (India, China). India
has gone from fewer than 1 percent of individuals using the Internet (in
2000–2001) to 18 percent in 2014; China has moved from 1.78 percent
in 2000 to 49.3 percent in 2014. Yet other Asian countries have poor
media infrastructure, including Bangladesh (9.6 percent internet users)
and Laos (14.26 percent) (International Telecommunications Union
2015). In Latin America, the mobile phone landscape is not homogenous, but the rapid spread of mobile phones is in part explained by
the previous lack of landlines. In a number of countries, total figures for
mobile phone subscriptions are high –for instance, Chile, Argentina,
and México (International Telecommunications Union 2016). However,
on closer inspection, there is a significant proportion of the population
in these and other countries without adequate access to mobile communication –either through not owning a phone or through restricted
use of services due to affordability (Donner 2015).
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Within countries, there are also striking disparities in access (SDG 9.c),
especially in rural and remote areas, among different sociodemographics,
cultural, ethnic, and racial groups, and groups with reduced or uncertain legal or citizenship status (for example migrants and internally
displaced persons). Upon closer inspection, many cities with apparent
“good infrastructure” display great differences between the media
“have-less” and “have-mores.” Yet other countries have seen extraordinary large-scale growth. Among China’s 688 million internet users
(2015), the vast majority (620 million) use social media applications
such as Weibo and Tencent’s Wechat; around 90 percent of China’s
internet-using population access the Internet through mobile phones,
while internet use for online payments, access to online education and
medical services, has become widespread among the middle classes.
We must, however, note the continuing lack of gender equity in access
to and use of media. Significantly fewer women are connected to the
Internet than men. In 24 of 29 European countries between 2008 and
2010, men outnumbered women users of the Internet. For the same
time period in non-European countries, men outnumbered women
users in 36 of 39 countries (comprising OECD and non-OECD countries). The “global internet user gender gap” widened from 11 percent in 2013 to 12 percent in 2016. In the poorest countries, the gap
is large: 31 percent in the least developed countries. On a regional
level, there is significant disparity in the gender gap: 23 percent in
Africa compared to the Americas. In many countries, gender often
intersects with other factors (e.g. location, age) to create even deeper
inequalities. Only a few countries report higher internet use by women
compared to men (International Telecommunications Union 2016).
Such figures give just a partial insight into a complex situation of
inequality. Profound changes in media technologies are typically
accompanied by promises to improve gender inequalities yet such
technologies are often unaffordable for many groups of women, and
gender is often neglected in design, education, and resource processes
531

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 16 Sep 2019 at 22:52:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399647.006

532

533

Chapter 13

crucial to ensuring communication rights. The emergence of new
technologies may generate new kinds of injustice and exclusion: misogyny and oppressive gender relations have taken disturbing forms
on social media platforms. Such gendered aspects of media and ICTs
significantly hinder social progress, as noted in the agenda laid out by
UNESCO‘s Global Alliance on Gender and Media.
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Media’s contribution to social progress cannot therefore be understood without grasping both the distribution and differentiation of
media access, and how they shape possibilities for political and social
agency.

13.2.4 Cultural Flows of Media Within Regions
Putting the complexities of media infrastructure to one side, media’s
cultural forms and consequences also vary significantly from region to
region. Western colonial powers such as the United Kingdom, France,
and the United States dominated global information flows during and
after the colonial period. Those media culture flows were unevenly
shaped by the long-standing centrality of the United States, with
which even the United Kingdom and France could not compete. Some
Western countries (such as France) developed media regulation to contest US cultural dominance and foster “national culture.”
In a globalized world, however, more complex flows of media culture
have evolved. Cultural globalization does not simply homogenize the
world, but instead reorganizes the production of cultural diversity
(Hannerz 1996). By creatively localizing and indigenizing US cultural
influences, some non-Western countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria,
Japan, South Korea, and India have achieved high levels of media production capacity, especially in the last two decades. The media outputs
of those countries circulate transnationally and are favorably received
within and beyond their regions, generating important counterflows
to US dominance.
In Latin America, the predominant mainstream cultural flow is
telenovelas, or “soap opera” TV drama series, which have been exported
globally. Export formats have evolved from selling program series to
selling only the show’s central idea or main character (Biltereyst and
Meers 2000; La Pastina and Straubhaar 2005).11 Mexican, Brazilian, and
Colombian television content has shifted what Latin Americans watch
on their screens. If 1970s and 1980s generations grew up watching
mainly US-produced imports, today’s Latin American audiences are
exposed to the customs, lifestyles, and social fabric of Latin American
communities themselves. And, although Latin American media content
still privileges the visibility of upper class and predominantly White
groups, some content does depict the experiences of working-class
and non-White Latin Americans. Additionally, free trade agreements
and the growing number of migrants from Latin American countries to
North America have generated new North–South media content flows;
since 1994, Spanish-language media has grown exponentially in the
United States, and Univisión (owned by Hallmark) and Telemundo
11

12
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(owned by Sony) are the two main Spanish-language cable television
networks. Univisión benefits from an agreement with Mexico’s Televisa,
including a pipeline of Spanish-language content. Other lesser players
in the global field of Spanish-language media include CNN, BBC, MTV,
and Fox, with news and sports channels entirely in Spanish.12 But
overall the unevenness of mainstream audiences’ daily media fare has
not changed much since the mid-1990s: Latin American media include
mostly Latin American and US content (music, films, TV), plus a trickle
of Japanese anime and European media content (mainly BBC). Flows
from other regions of the world (Africa, South and Southeast Asia) are
still scarce.
The impact of globalization on African media has also shifted the flows
and contraflows of media content and capital. After the long dominance
of ex-colonial powers, many countries have recently developed media
production capacities. A prominent example is the growth of the Nigerian
film industry “Nollywood,” which exports to a global audience (Krings
and Onookome 2013; Larkin 2008). It has become the third largest
global producer of feature films, next to Hollywood (United States) and
Bollywood (India), relying increasingly on coproduction and distribution
with the Ghanaian film industry. Also notable are the growing African
and global footprint of the South African media giant Naspers, and significant foreign investment in African media firms, especially from China
(Xinhua news agency, China Central Television: see Section 13.2.1).
In Asia, India, Hong Kong, and Japan have developed local film and
TV industries and their outputs have circulated within the region
for many years. However, circulation outside the region has jumped
sharply in the last two decades. The global diffusion of Bollywood
films has become much more prominent (Kavoori and Punathambekar
2008; Gopal and Moorti 2008). In East Asia, cultural products such as
manga, animation, video games, and TV dramas produced in Japan
have generated a regional and global media culture since the 1990s
(Iwabuchi 2002). Even more notable is the so-called “Korean Wave”
(or Halryu, a term first coined by Chinese reporters in 1999), whereby
Korean cultural products such as films, television dramas, fashion, and
popular music (K-pop) have penetrated other Asian markets (Chua
and Iwabuchi 2008; Kim 2013), Europe, and Latin America. The Korean
Wave offers an intriguing example of how national cultural policy can
be used as a form of soft power, bolstering local production capacity
and promoting the export of media culture by “creative industries.”
South Korea’s interventionist cultural policies position the Korean cultural industry as a “sub-empire” of the Hollywood system in Asia. The
“Korean Wave” thus signifies the Korean culture industry’s ambiguous
position as both a counterflow against the Hollywood system and a
subflow co-opted by Hollywood.
This complexity characterizes counterflows in other regions too. The
more counterflows to American media culture advance, the more
market-driven governance encompasses them. Even though relatively
independent from the cultural dominance of the “Hollywood empire,”
the rise of media culture flows in non-Western regions has given rise
to new intraregional asymmetries. American media culture maintains

The best example is the Colombian Ugly Betty, which has a Mexican and a US adaptation, each completely different from the Colombian source, apart from the main character
(Miller 2010).
http://palabraclave.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/palabraclave/article/viewFile/4669/pdf.
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a pivotal presence, yet in a way that goes beyond a straightforward
understanding of American cultural hegemony. Hollywood itself has
striven to incorporate capital, talent, and narratives from many parts of
the world and develop outsourcing of postproduction labor on a global
scale (Miller et al. 2004). The rise of non-Western media cultures forms
part of a market-driven recentralization in which diverse players across
the world collaborate to penetrate transnational markets, engendering
a new kind of governance via marketing, coproduction, distribution,
and copyright monopoly. Section 13.3 will discuss the emergence of
global governance infrastructures for the regulation of information
and data.
This is not to underestimate the newly emerging landscape of media
globalization. Together with the progress of digital communication technologies, the acceleration of human mobilities from and among non-
Western regions (by migrants, expatriates, students) has complicated
the cross-
border circulation and consumption of media cultures.
Meanwhile cultural counterflows between diverse regions and countries cultivate cross-border exchange and dialogue, with important
implications for social progress. Regional circulation of diverse media
cultures has enabled new kinds of cross-border connection, mutual
understanding, and self-reflexivity by people about their own society
and culture. The mutual consumption of media cultures, for example
of entertainment genres popular with women audiences such as soap
operas, has enabled mutual understanding of societies and cultures,
for example in regions such as East Asia. However, as it is predominantly market-oriented forces that have advanced cross-border media
circulation, it is the commercially and ideologically dominant elements
of each country’s media culture that tend to travel, under-representing
marginalized voices (Iwabuchi 2002, 2015). Crucial questions thus
remain: whose voices and concerns are excluded, what perceptions
of self–other relationships are typically promoted, and which issues
are under-represented, as the marketization of media culture flows
advances? Section 13.5 considers the ambivalent consequences for
practices of global citizenship that such media connections may foster.

13.2.5 Digital Disruptions and Transformations
(Technological, Geo-Political)
Even before 2005, the global media landscape was highly uneven, and
its implications for social progress correspondingly complex. Some key
developments since the middle of the century’s first decade (when
Facebook, the world’s current most successful social media platform,
was launched) have increased this complexity considerably. Of course
there is not today “one” Internet –much of the Internet is inaccessible
in language to large sections of the world’s population –but some key
patterns are clear.
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a “read/write” interface has intensified internet use and its embedding
in daily life, heightening institutional attention to how audiences can
be reached online and stimulating the rise of a vast commercial infrastructure of online data collection and data processing. This shift in
media as “infrastructure” has involved also a significant cultural shift,
as patterns of use have changed (a shift in media as “meaning”). This
double shift has multiple consequences.
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First, the increasing dependence in daily life on a complex, distributed
online infrastructure for mediating daily life changes the power
dynamics within the media industries, leading to the increased importance of the telecommunications industries that provide infrastructures
of connection (Wi-Fi and broadband networks). Market convergence
means that telecommunications providers have the power of control
“in the last instance” over the communication systems on which all
content distribution depends (Bolin 2011). Consider the vast scale
of some new media infrastructure companies: Google‘s annual revenue in 2015 was 74.5 billion USD, Facebook‘s 17.9 billion USD, and
Amazon’s 107 billion USD.13
But the global balance is no longer one of simple US dominance. By
the end of 2014, of the top 10 internet companies in the world, 6 are
US and 4 are Chinese. Indeed, the growing power of China’s internet
market, with its distinctive Chinese platforms (Sina’s Weibo, Tencent’s
Wechat) is such that Shi (2015) has argued that cyberspace now has
two camps, GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple) and BATJ
(Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Jingdong). As a result, “the material foundation for US–China co-governance of the Internet is in shape” (Shi 2015).
This observation was made at the 2015 World Internet Conference
Wuzhen Summit at which the Chinese state’s effort promoted its goal
of shaping the future of global internet governance, a strategy with
profound implications not only for China, but also for global communication politics.
Second, such developing power concentrations have implications for
evermore sectors of everyday life from government to health (SDG 3).
Take also education (SDG 4): concerns are developing regarding school
learning materials increasingly provided not by the state but by commercial media companies such as Apple and Google through initiatives
such as Apple Education and Google for Education. Weaker welfare
and public service systems are creating opportunities for market
advances in areas such as education that were not previously much
commercially exploited (Forsman 2014; Selwyn 2014).

Third, none of these developments would be possible without a huge
double development in media’s “infrastructures of connection”: the
vast infrastructure of data collection and processing that drives the
activities of search engines and all sorts of digital platforms and, underpinning them, the default infrastructure of “cloud computing” (Mosco
The key technological development has been the shift from so- 2014) that provides the capacity necessary for such data collection and
called “web 1.0” –a system of media infrastructure based on dis- processing, and for the general expansion of computer-based informacrete websites, connected by hypertext links, with access obtained tion processing in everyday life (for example, the “Internet of Things”).
from desktop or laptop computers –to “web 2.0” characterized by Both developments expand what we mean by “media” and create
increasing use of interactive online platforms, in particular social new challenges for governance (see Section 13.3).
media platforms. Today, both platforms and websites are increasingly
accessed from phones and other mobile devices, and the applications
(or “apps”) embedded within them. This change from a “read only” to 13 www.statista.com/.
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At the same time, deep inequalities of access remain, as noted
in Section 13.2.2. The African continent, for example, remains
characterized by widespread poverty, huge socioeconomic inequalities, and highly differentiated patterns of media access and use,
with the central parts of the continent most deprived (Porter and
Stern 2015: 17, 50). Such inequalities have important implications
for citizens’ ability to participate in any mediated public sphere (see
Sections 13.4 and 13.5).
We cannot therefore say that the “whole world” is being transformed
by media at the same time and in the same way. Yet the overall direction of these large-scale transformations is changing how we think
about media’s potential contribution to social progress.

13.3 The Governance of Media Infrastructures
As we showed in Section 13.2, the global media landscape is complex and uneven, reflecting many diverse histories. The often opaque
structures of media governance that have emerged in the digital era
are another factor that complicates media and communications’ contribution to social progress.

13.3.1 The Evolving Relations Between Media
Infrastructures and Government Regulation
of Information Flows
Governments worldwide have expressed interests in regulating media
infrastructures. In some cases, such interests take the form of laws
directly prescribing the conditions of information access and exchange
or the technical capabilities of media infrastructures. In others, legal
incentives for the takedown of certain kinds of information produce
regulatory effects.
Legal regimes in many countries protect freedom of expression, but all
governments prohibit the publication and exchange of certain types of
information. Additionally, “[m]any democracies now deploy national-
level filtering systems through which all ISPs (or in some cases most
major ones) are compelled to block designated lists of websites to
address public concerns about … illegal activities conducted on the
Internet” (MacKinnon 2012: 95). Typical subjects of legal prohibitions
include child pornography, speech offering material assistance to
terrorists, speech that infringes intellectual property rights, and speech
ruled to be defamatory. Additionally, some countries prohibit the dissemination of hate speech, and many set limits on the collection, dissemination, and processing of personal information, although data protection
regimes vary considerably from country to country. There are good
reasons for all these prohibitions, but each involves governments in
decisions about what is or is not prohibited, and therefore raises the possibility of overbroad interpretation leading to censorship of other, nominally protected expression. Such decisions necessarily have implications
for the quality of social life and the possibilities for social progress.
14
15
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In some situations, legal rules incentivize media infrastructure companies to create notice-
and-
takedown mechanisms for removal
of prohibited information. To create an additional, more consistent
set of incentives for removal, many countries have enacted legislation that provides safe harbor from copyright infringement liability
if procedures are followed for removal of unauthorized copyright-
protected materials from publicly available websites and/or exclusion of such materials from search results. The first copyright safe
harbor legislation was enacted by the United States as part of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.14 Similar provisions have
been enacted in many other countries, often following inclusion of
such obligations in bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements
negotiated by the United States (Fink and Reichenmiller 2006; see also
Valdes and McCann 2014). More recently, European legal instruments
regarding privacy and data protection have been interpreted to afford
enforceable rights to deindexing and erasure of information made
available online.15 Those rulings have prompted some online information providers, including most notably Google, to develop notice-
and-
takedown mechanisms patterned after the copyright model
(Powles and Chaparro 2015). Such legal structures play important
roles in shaping the “rules of the game” regarding information flow
in daily life.
Meanwhile, governments in some regions have invested heavily in
the development of technologies for regulating citizens’ informational activities more directly and on highly granular levels. South
Korea, for example, for several years enforced a “real-name system”
for internet access that prevented anonymous expression online. In
2012, the Constitutional Court of Korea struck down the real-name
requirements, ruling that they violated internet users’ freedom of
speech.16 Automated content filtering of information supplied via
media infrastructures is pervasive. Such filtering is often justified by
asserted needs that parallel the reasons offered for direct speech
prohibitions (e.g. protection against pornography, copyright infringement, and/or defamation and harassment); in operation, however, it
also seeks to police and deny access to content for political reasons
(MacKinnon 2012).
On another level, not just governments but corporations (from
Europe, North America, and Asia) are heavily involved in the building
of media infrastructures, for example through the export of technologies to the Global South. Such infrastructures often include
built-in capacities for censorship and surveillance. Chinese companies export technologies similar to those developed to Communist
Party specifications for domestic use (MacKinnon 2012). When the
Zimbabwean government jammed shortwave broadcasts in the
run-up to the 2005 elections, it was believed to have done so by
using jamming equipment provided by China (Wu 2012). But North
American and European companies such as Cisco also export information technologies built to customer specification to enable informational control, and global platform companies have acceded to
demands for censorship to gain access to local markets (Stirland
2008; Wu 2012).

Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–304, Title II: Online Liability Limitation, 112 Stat. 2860, codified as amended at 17 USC. § 512.
Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja Gonzalez, No. C-131/12, May 13, 2014.
Constitutional Court Decision 2010Hun-Ma47, August 23, 2012.
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13.3.2 The Shift From Formal to Informal Governance
and the Rise of New Global/Transnational
Governance Institutions
Direct government mandates, prohibitions, and procurements are the
most obvious mechanisms through which media infrastructures are
governed, but other mechanisms are equally important. The emergence of a networked information economy and the globalization of
mediated information flows have catalyzed two significant shifts in
the nature and quality of governance. The first is a shift away from
formal government regulation toward informal and often highly
corporatized governance mechanisms. The second is a shift away
from state-based governance (and global governance institutions
organized around state membership) toward transnational governance institutions more directly responsive to the asserted needs of
private entities, often also corporations, that are those institutions’
“stakeholders.” Both trends, if they continue unabated, may result
in a serious imbalance inconsistent with SDG 16, which calls for the
building of “effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all
levels.”
Particularly in the Global North but also the Global South, the
information networks and communication protocols that underlie
media infrastructures are designed and operated by private, corporate entities. Direct technical authority over networks and
protocols gives those entities an authority that is inherently regulatory. Global platform companies such as Google, Twitter, Facebook,
Microsoft, and Apple, each of which occupies a dominant market
position globally, enjoy correspondingly stronger and more pervasive regulatory power.
The regulatory effects of technology take a variety of forms and
produce a variety of effects, some beneficial and others less so. For
example, security measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to
networks, servers, and accounts protect private, personal information,
and important corporate and government information from prying eyes
and malicious actors. Flawed or poorly implemented security measures
can introduce vulnerabilities into the network, exposing individuals
to identity theft, surveillance, censorship, and political persecution.
Likewise, flawed or poorly implemented security measures can expose
corporations, governments, and key power and communications
infrastructures to espionage and cyberattack. But technical protections
applied to media infrastructures and content flows can also have direct
impacts on important aspects of social life: for example, affecting the
information access necessary for education, self-development, cultural
participation, informed voting, and open and democratic government
(Citron 2008; Cohen 2012). Governance processes in relation to media
infrastructures are therefore much more than a “technical” concern.
There are other examples of how media governance affects social life.
Many platform companies (e.g. Google/YouTube, Facebook, Twitter)
employ filtering algorithms to remove or de-list content that infringes
copyright and related rights. Such automated mechanisms for content removal tend to be over-inclusive, removing both material that
is clearly infringing and material that would be covered by the various
limitations and exceptions to copyright (Quilter and Urban 2005; see
also United Nations 2011).
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In addition, many platform companies employ predictive algorithms
to determine what information to display to their users. In networked
digital media and particularly for mobile applications, access to information is comprehensively mediated by such algorithms, which process
data collected from users, often in combination with data purchased
from other information collectors and aggregators, and rely on what is
known or inferred about users to generate correlations and predictions
(Bolin 2011; Turow 2011). National security services engage in similar
data collection and process, often sharing the results with one another
and helping each other circumvent the restrictions that might apply to
data collection and processing conducted within territorial boundaries
(Privacy International 2013). Like the filtering algorithms used for content monitoring, the predictive algorithms used in commercial contexts
are maintained as proprietary trade secrets, while their counterparts
on the intelligence side are maintained as state secrets. In both cases,
secrecy frustrates efforts to document and understand the effects of such
filtering processes on the flow of daily life and on everyday freedoms
(Cohen 2012; Pasquale 2015).
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The relationships between governments and the corporate entities that
exercise alternative forms of governance over media infrastructures
are complex and often contested. For governments seeking greater
regulatory authority over media infrastructures, the control exercised
by corporate entities presents an obvious target for regulatory intervention (Birnhack and Elkin-Koren 2006; MacKinnon 2012; United
Nations 2011). In China, for example, the coordination between state
and private governance is relatively tight, fueled by close ties between
the state/communist party and IT conglomerates.
In North America and Europe, by contrast, the interplay of state
and private governance mechanisms is more complicated. There
are powerful pressures to comply with government demands for
access to information for law enforcement and national security
purposes, as the Snowden revelations showed. In the wake of
those revelations, however, some companies, including most notably Apple, have redesigned their products and services to offer
users greater privacy for their communications with each other
(though, as we discuss in Section 13.3.3, they have continued to
collect other data streams for predictive targeting) and have more
aggressively resisted government demands for access (Powles and
Chaparro 2016; Yadron 2016).
Outside the law enforcement context, dynamics tend to be somewhat different, and reflect a greater perceived alignment of state
and private interests. For example, US companies that engage in
collection and processing of personal information often count government entities among their customers (Hoofnagle 2004), and have
looked to the US government to protect their economic interests in
relation to claims for stronger privacy and data protection regulation. European information companies, for their part, value cross-
border trade but also look to the European Union for protection
against US-based rivals. With regard to private economic rights in
information, copyright safe harbour legislation effectively positions
corporate information businesses as the regulators of first resort. So
far, however, efforts to impose in law parallel takedown obligations
on payment providers and domain name system registrars have not
succeeded.
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The second shift described in this section –from state-based to
transnational governance –involves two types of transnational governance institutions: trade dispute resolution bodies and technical
standards bodies, in both of which the relative regulatory influence
of corporations is growing. The global trade system has become a key
mechanism through which both nation-states and powerful corporate
actors pursue their interests in regulating media infrastructures and
controlling information flows. Many completed global, regional,
and bilateral trade agreements –and many others currently under
negotiation –contain key provisions dealing with recognition and
enforcement of intellectual property rights and with flows of data
and information services across borders (Calabrese and Briziarelli
2011; Freedman 2003). Although trade agreements typically contain
provisions exempting protections for public health, environmental
protection, and privacy rights from designation as nontariff barriers,17
the extent of those exemptions is unclear and their scope contested
(Public Citizen 2015a). Arbitral proceedings alleging violations of
trade agreements therefore may work at cross purposes with efforts
by domestic legislatures and courts and international human rights
tribunals to set appropriate limits on right-holder control of information and on the collection, processing, and use of personal information to sort and categorize individuals and communities.
Meanwhile, technical standards bodies have attained increasing prominence and power. Networked digital communications operate via
information transfer protocols. Such protocols determine the resources
to which individuals and communities have access and, depending
on their design, may enable particular types of surveillance or afford
bottlenecks at which state or corporate regulatory authority can be
brought to bear (DeNardis 2014; MacKinnon 2012). Those protocols
are the responsibility of an interlocking network of global standards
bodies, including the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). These bodies have
different charges and varying degrees of connection to more traditional governance institutions.
For example, the ITU, which oversees standardization and implementation of a variety of protocols for telecommunication, broadcasting, and
data transfer, is overseen by the United Nations and representation is
state-based, whereas the ICANN, which oversees the Internet naming
and addressing protocols and maintains a dispute resolution system
for resolving trademark-related domain name disputes, is a standalone
corporate body chartered under the laws of California, with policies set
by an elected board of directors.
In these multiple ways, the ability of national governments, and indirectly national civil societies, to influence the workings of media in
everyday life (through governance structures) has been challenged
by the cross-cutting ability of corporate interests to impose governance through other means. In considering the potential implications of
media for social progress we need therefore to take into account this
underlying shift in regulatory power.
17

18
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13.3.3 The Ambiguous Implications of Media-Based
Governance for Social Progress
For citizens, networked digital media infrastructures may lower the
costs of access to knowledge and enable new forms of participation
in social, cultural, and economic life (see Section 13.5). At the same
time, however, citizens’ access to many important informational and
cultural resources is subject to control by neo-authoritarian states
and by information intermediaries of various sorts, including internet
access providers, search engines, mobile applications developers,
and designers of proprietary media ecosystems. Such control often
materially affects the level and quality of access. The implications for
social progress are clearest when particular materials are blocked or
removed, but mediated access also produces a range of other effects,
which may or may not be consistent with SDG 9 concerning the construction of “resilient infrastructures” and the promotion of “inclusive
and sustainable industrialization.”
The increasingly global regime for intellectual property protection
both incentivizes worldwide distribution of informational and cultural
resources and creates additional barriers for those seeking access to such
resources. As already suggested in Section 13.2.5, licensing requirements
for access to educational, professional, and technical materials can be
onerous and the need to pay recurring fees for continued access to
digitalized resources (rather than, for example, purchasing hard copies
to which one may enjoy permanent access) disproportionately burdens
public institutions and lower-resourced communities. In the Global South,
the costs of access to copyrighted materials can render access infeasible
even for educational institutions and libraries (Chon 2007; Okediji 2004,
2006). In addition, a 1967 Berne Convention protocol governing translation rights is not widely used because its protections are difficult for
developing countries to invoke. Among other things, the protocol requires
that a compulsory licensing system be fully implemented in domestic
law and does not make adequate provision for minority languages.18 The
Global South has adopted a variety of ad hoc solutions, but the lack of a
clear framework often stymies efforts to make informational and cultural
works available to global audiences that are linguistically and culturally
diverse (Cerda Silva 2012).
In many parts of the world and for large parts of the population,
everyday life routinely involves online access to a wide variety of
purveyors of news, information, and popular culture, as well as search
engines, social networking platforms, and other content aggregators
that seek to help users find, organize, and make sense of it all. Access
to these resources may be offered at no financial cost to users on
an advertiser-supported basis, but often such access has a price, in
the form of the automated collection of information about personal
reading, viewing, and listening habits (Hoofnagle and Whittington
2014). Such information can be used both to target advertising and to
suggest content more likely to appeal to each user.
Such predictive targeting of information access has a number of troubling economic and political implications. Algorithms for predictive

See, for example, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX: General Exceptions, www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXX; General Agreement
on Trade in Services, art. XIV: General Exceptions, www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gats_02_e.htm#article14.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Appendix art. II, www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698#P421_79913.
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targeting based on data about personal habits and preferences
necessarily enable the identification of population segments sorted
by, for example, race/nationality, cultural background, religious affiliation, socioeconomic status, and political preferences. Commercially,
targeting based on such indicators raises the prospect of invidious
discrimination in the distribution of goods and services, in decisions
about employment and credit, and in myriad other ways (Barocas and
Selbst 2016; Robinson and Yu 2014). The ability to conduct relatively
granular price discrimination over those goods and services, in ways
that deprive ordinary individuals of choice and corresponding marketplace leverage, sits in tension with free-market ideologies and raises
profound distributive justice questions (Cohen 2015).
Turning to politics, micro-targeting of media content and political
appeals that align with (inferences about) recipients’ preexisting
inclinations creates the prospect of an “echo chamber” or “filter
bubble” effect, through which preexisting inclinations become
reinforced and public opinion about political and cultural issues
becomes correspondingly polarized (Pariser 2011; Sunstein 2009).19
Individuals themselves can come to rely on filtering processes to simplify the information environment and reduce information overload
(Andrejevic 2013). In an era in which descriptions of policy problems
increasingly are subject to expert mediation –as with climate change
or the global financial crisis –the filter bubble effect can work to
entrench beliefs in ways that are highly resistant to scientific challenge
or debunking (Andrejevic 2013: 12–18, 42–61, 113–132). This can
undermine efforts to mobilize popular and political support for action
toward social progress on various fronts (environmental sustainability,
financial accountability, and so on).
A final set of ambiguities concerns the newly prominent transnational
governance institutions described in Section 13.3.2. Governance of
media infrastructures and information flows via trade and technical
standards bodies provides harmonization that many argue is essential in an increasingly interconnected world. But the new transnational governance institutions are accountable neither to national
governments nor to traditional international governance institutions,
and many lack robust democratic traditions of their own. Participation
in such institutions may be perceived as offering opportunities for
powerful national and/or commercial interests to avoid roadblocks
interposed by domestic regulation, by the international human rights
framework, and by civil society groups (Benvenisti 2015). Within the
global trade system, both negotiation and dispute resolution processes
are highly responsive to corporate interests yet much less responsive
to other interests. Trade dispute resolution panels convened by the
World Trade Organization have, to date, ruled against states asserting
protective regulation in all but one of the cases in which domestic
protective regulations have been challenged (Public Citizen 2015a). In
recent rounds of negotiation over high-profile multilateral agreements
such as the Trans Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, trade associations representing corporate
interests have enjoyed privileged access to country-level negotiators
and working drafts, while civil society groups and interested members
of the public have been allowed only brief glimpses of later-stage
19
20
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documents, and only on condition of confidentiality.20 Technical
standards bodies, meanwhile, are only gradually coming to terms with
their own role as governance bodies (DeNardis 2009, 2014; MacKinnon
2012: 203–219).
The result is a landscape of everyday media consumption configured
by forces that are increasingly in tension with shared flows of information and open, inclusive development. The multiple overlapping
processes for governing media’s underlying infrastructures are ever
more secretive and resistant to civil society influence. This is the
complex starting point for thinking about two important potential
contributions of media and communications to social progress: the
role of journalism in the production of public knowledge (Section 13.4)
and the role of networked communications in enabling new forms of
citizenship (Section 13.5).

13

13.4 Journalism and Public Knowledge
One key way in which media can contribute to social progress over the
long term is through the provision of public knowledge (Sen 1999).
The term “public knowledge” refers to the resources that citizens have
for forming informed opinions about matters of public and general
interest. Journalism has for centuries been a key institutional form for
disseminating such knowledge.

13.4.1 Public Knowledge for Democracy and
Social Progress
Digital media infrastructures create new opportunities for the dissemination of public knowledge. Although the decline in civic participation
in established democratic societies has been widely lamented (Putnam
2000), other observers (Dahlgren 2009; Lewis, Inthorn, and Wahl-
Jorgensen 2005) have pointed to the growth of new communities online
and the growth in quantity and diversity in communication platforms
outside of the traditional news media, where citizens can exchange information and participate in political debate. Additionally, whereas public
knowledge traditionally was disseminated through news and information in the press, radio, and television, social networking platforms are
becoming a major news source for citizens. A recent survey conducted
in the United States found that 44 percent of respondents get their daily
news from social media (IPSP 2017). The question of citizenship is complex, and cannot be dealt with at length here: we note, however, that
large parts of the world’s population live without citizenship, and citizenship in a nation-state does not protect citizens from rights-affecting
actions controlled by institutions outside of the nation-state.
Early research on public knowledge overemphasized news distribution
and correspondingly undervalued other sources of information, such
as popular culture and entertainment (Corner 1991). Both sources of
information can contribute to the formation of public knowledge and
to social progress, as can be appreciated when we consider the political and cultural aspects of citizenship. Where political citizenship deals

In the United States, practices of political microtargeting are becoming widespread. See Beckett (2012).
See, for example, Inman (2016), Schneider (2014).

537
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 16 Sep 2019 at 22:52:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399647.006

538

539

Chapter 13

with issues related to the formal rights (and duties) of citizens, and is
most often mediated by traditional categories of news about current
affairs and politics, cultural citizenship deals with questions of recognition, identity, and the cultural rights (and duties) of citizens, and is
mediated by various sorts of information that circulate in the cultural
public sphere.
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The distinction between political and cultural citizenship may become
more blurred when the convergence of entertainment media and political citizenship is taken seriously (Hermes 2005; Van Zoonen 2005;
Williams and Delli Carpini 2011). The rise of bots and algorithmic management of information introduces additional distortions of public
deliberation (Tambini 2017). But none of this potential to create public
knowledge matters if media content produced by an elite “professional” class of journalists does not resonate with audiences’ everyday
lived experience. Today various factors point in that direction, both in
forms of propaganda and destabilizing communicative practices and in
problems within systems of education, where much of the socializing
of citizens take place (SPI “Access to basic knowledge”).
In this section we outline, first, the special roles that journalism plays
in public knowledge, and so why journalism is important for democracy and social progress. We will then give examples of the various
“soft” and “hard” threats that we identify as detrimental to public
knowledge, including both changes in business models, news reception, and new forms of “information management,” and, more directly,
various physical threats against news production, and journalists in
conflict areas and unstable democracies. Third, we will point to areas
where there are opportunities for countering this negative picture,
for example the rise of citizen journalism and alternative media. We
end this section with a double case study of organized attempts to
construct alternative journalistic narratives in Latin America and the
Middle East.

13.4.2 The Special Functions of Journalism and
Journalistic Practice
Journalism is still associated, especially in the established democracies
of the Global North, with the institutions and practices of democracy
(Fenton 2010: 3). There are many examples, both historical and current,
of how journalism has contributed to public knowledge for social progress (SDG 16). These include, for example, the antislavery campaigns
that benefited from press assistance with the formation of abolitionist
organizations (King and Haveman 2008), samizdat publications in the
former Soviet Union (Feldbrugge 1975), information about environmental disasters such as the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident that
was spread not only by mainstream journalists but also by citizens on
blogging and social media platforms (Friedman 2011), or the role of
the underground press in the struggle against apartheid (Switzer and
Adhikari 2000). For these reasons the contribution of journalism to
public knowledge remains an important reference point in the broader
context of global social progress.
The emergence of digital media infrastructures has had profound
implications for traditional conceptions of news and journalism. These
include a proliferation of the channels through which journalism is
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produced and consumed, and a blurring of the lines between news
and entertainment through the rise of formats such as the “mockumentary,” “docudrama,” and satirical news. The participatory potential
of digital technologies, aided by the widespread accessibility of technologies such as the mobile phone, has challenged previous claims
by professional journalists to exclusivity in the purveying of news.
Additionally, the business models for journalism have undergone a
fundamental transformation in recent years, even as new opportunities have arisen for the creation of public knowledge and citizen participation in the construction of knowledge and public debate.
Against the background of rapid change, however, the expectation that
news journalism will contribute to public knowledge, the monitoring of
power, and the facilitation of public debate remains an ideal against
which communication practices continue to be measured. The mere
fact that information is publicly disseminated and available does not
automatically result in an informed public. Additionally, in the context of changing frameworks of reception, citizens’ ability to orientate
themselves in today’s increasingly complex media landscape, drawing
perhaps on the skills provided by education, are ever more important.

13.4.3 Threats to Public Knowledge 1: System Pressures
The digitization and marketization of media (discussed in Section 13.2)
have affected the institutional conditions for journalistic production.
New economic conditions have led the news industries into a downward spiral where it has become ever more difficult to charge for content. In a recent survey conducted by the IPSP in the United States,
57 percent of respondents do not like to pay for news, and believe
news should be freely accessible to all (IPSP 2017). Shrinking readership makes advertisers abandon print media to the benefit of online
search and social networking.
The old business models of journalism are collapsing, and news
producers have had to rethink their relation to audiences, leading
in turn to changes in journalistic practice. New forms of “click-bait
journalism,” robot journalism, and algorithmically steered news production are increasingly common. These follow different logics from
traditional journalism, and in their most extreme forms may produce
echo chambers or filter bubbles (see Section 13.3) that in the long
run fragment public debate and the public sphere more generally. The
automated search for audiences through data processing also may further marginalize those audiences who are already on the margins of
the public sphere. In countries where access to the digital public sphere
mirrors huge social and economic equalities –for instance South
Africa, India, China, and Brazil –these new practices could exacerbate
such inequalities.
The reorganization of media production into large-
scale media
corporations with interests also in non-journalistic media production has meant that even financially successful journalistic and public
knowledge operations cannot always reinvest their profits into news
production, but instead have their profits reinvested in other activities.
This lack of economic control makes it difficult to sustain long-term
strategies of news production. While there has always been a tension
between editorial and management teams within news organizations,
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large-scale media corporations shift economic decision-making farther
away from news production environments, resulting in managerial
decisions that direct journalistic practice from the outside.
There are also regulative threats to independent news media production, for example the noncommercial and license fee funded public
service media. In Europe, the traditional freedom of public service
broadcasters to choose their policy orientations has come under attack
by newly powerful private broadcasters (SPI “Press freedom”). One
result is the public value test instigated by the European Commission,
which emerged from private broadcasters’ intense lobbying efforts in
relation to the European Commission (Donders and Moe 2011).
While online (including mobile) media have created new platforms for
social agency and public participation, both in the creation of “user-
generated content” (UGC) for mainstream media and in providing
outlets for alternative news and views, the Internet has also become
a space where reactionary views, racist representations, and hate
speech can thrive. Social media like Facebook and Twitter contribute
to the proliferation of this kind of communication. Misunderstandings
of complex matters and online “lynch mobs” illustrate the volatility
of networked digital media environments and offer testimony to the
limits of social media for public debate. On a more fundamental level,
well-meaning educational initiatives to foster “digital literacy” might
produce relativistic approaches to scientific and social truths (Boyd
2017), and the journalistic ideals of balance of opinion might privilege
a blurring of the distinction between facts and opinions, and where
“truth” becomes more of an affective mood.

13.4.4 Threats to Public Knowledge 2: Coercive Force
Meanwhile, journalists can face harder forms of threat, whether
through legal frameworks (press freedom or its opposite) or informal
threats (through damage to journalists’ physical and psychological
security): these threats may exist separately or in combination.
In many parts of the world, growing political instability has affected
journalism‘s ability to fulfil its broader public knowledge goals because
of direct threats to press freedom (see SPI “Press Freedom”). For
example, in some parts of Eastern Europe, political polarization has
arisen as some post-Soviet states have sought closer ties with the
EU. The Ukraine–Russia conflict is one, widely reported, outgrowth of
this polarization, but the phenomenon is also visible in other post-
Soviet countries (Richter 2015). Information warfare is on the rise,
not only in the region itself, but also in international news media (for
example, via TV channels such as Russia Today and Ukraine Today
[Miazhevich 2014]). Initiatives for disinformation and propaganda/
counterpropaganda, including so-called “troll-factories” maintained in
Russia (and elsewhere),21 make efforts to enhance public knowledge
increasingly difficult. The sheer amount of seemingly contradictory information circulating puts high pressure on audiences’ critical abilities (the
much discussed phenomenon of “fake news“). A recent example of this
21
22
23

Chapter 13

from the Ukraine–Russia conflict is the overload of contradictory information that surrounded the shooting down of Malaysian flight MH17
over eastern Ukraine in 2014, and the sharply divergent accounts that
circulated on the Internet both before and after the Dutch Safety Board
published their report of the crash.22 Similar dynamics have emerged in
the Middle East, leading to an increasingly polarized and propaganda-
dominated public sphere (see Section 13.4.6).
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In many African countries also, journalism for public knowledge
remains an ideal rather than a practical reality. In the Windhoek
Declaration on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African Press
(UNESCO 1991), African journalists invoked the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights as a motivation for the promotion of press freedom.
At the same time, however, African resistance to colonialism and rejection of cultural imperialism engendered an insistence on “African
values” in journalism, couched in the discourse of development but
often implying uncritical and loyalist media support of postcolonial
states. An example of an appeal to “African values” is Francis Kasoma’s
(1994, 1996) notion of “Afriethics,” which rejects Western normative
frameworks and counterposes an African value system that privileges
communalism and an orientation towards the family and clan over
individualism. Appeals to “African values” have often been criticized
for their tendency to essentialize African culture and identity, without
acknowledging the interpenetration of African and Western values in
a globalized context (Banda 2009; Skjerdal 2012). Additionally, such
appeals have served to justify repression of media freedom in many
African countries (see Bourgault 1995; Karikari 2007).
Lastly, against the background of political instability, propaganda wars,
and state repression, violence against journalists has also increased.
Some examples include: Egypt clamping down on journalists, activists,
and civil society; the consolidation of electoral autocracy and temporary closure of digital platforms in Turkey; and repressive measures
from verbal threats to physical assaults and imprisonment in various
African countries. In Poland, a new legal regime has circumscribed the
freedom for journalists, making critical and investigative journalism
more difficult and precarious.23

13.4.5 Opportunities for Public Knowledge: New Forms
of Journalism and Citizens’ Media
Meanwhile, digital media infrastructures have enabled the growth of
new forms of citizen-created media for the production of public knowledge. In many African contexts where legacy media like newspapers
and radio stations are owned and controlled by the state, digital media
platforms have served as alternative outlets for the dissemination of
news, political debate, and critique (Paterson 2013). In Zimbabwe,
Facebook has provided users with more freedom to engage in political satire and offer alternative accounts of political developments
(Mare 2014). The widespread penetration and use of mobile media in
Africa have also provided users with a tool to engage more actively
with mainstream news agendas. An example of this was the mobile

See www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/18/trolls-putin-russia-savchuk or www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-house.
See www.onderzoeksraad.nl/.
See www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35257105.
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phone footage of police brutality against a Mozambican immigrant,
Mido Macia, in Daveyton, South Africa. The footage of police dragging
Macia, cuffed to a police vehicle, was captured by a bystander and
sent to the tabloid the Daily Sun, who posted the video online and
reported on it. The video went viral and made headlines internationally
after Macia died in police custody, and led to the arrest and conviction of the police officers. This integration of citizen journalism, legacy
media (especially tabloids), and online platforms such as Youtube or
Facebook, has provided journalists and news consumers with new
ways of creating public knowledge and serving the public interest.
In South Korea, citizen journalists have used digital networks for producing alternative civic discourses and for mobilizing enormous rallies of
citizens to speak out on socially sensitive issues. More recently, social
media have given rise to new alternative media such as Newstapa
(“Rebuilding Investigative Journalism”) launched in January 2012. Due
to the government’s control over public broadcasting, some former
employees of the major TV networks and other small-sized production
team members have come together to produce an investigative news
program about social issues. Newstapa uses a variety of online outlets
such as its own webpage views, YouTube clips, and podcast episodes,
and the younger generations download and watch its weekly episodes
using their smartphones. Social media also play a key role in spreading
the news program’s schedule and in enabling public fundraising to
support production. Newstapa has gained a reputation as an influential news provider and as illustrating how, through regular practices of
collaboration, citizens can build alternative paradigms of social justice
against mainstream media and power elites.
Meanwhile, during the political turmoil and violence following the
ousting of former President Yanukovich in Ukraine, faculty and students
from the Mohyla School of Journalism in Kyiv created StopFake
(stopfake.org), an organization aimed at debunking Russian propaganda and the distorted news produced by troll-factories. Another civic
initiative formed during the political turmoil was The Ukraine Crisis
Media Centre, which is a platform for information management that
arranges press briefings with representatives of the Ukrainian military
and government (Bolin, Jordan, and Ståhlberg 2016).
There are therefore many overlapping factors shaping media’s possible
contribution to public knowledge in different parts of the world today.
In the next part of this section, we offer a double case study from Latin
America and the Middle East that considers the possibilities of building
new infrastructures for journalism that can offer alternative voices to
counter perceived dominant narratives.

13.4.6 Double Case Study: TeleSUR and Al-
Jazeera: Alternative Voices in Global News
The Venezuelan channel TeleSUR and the Qatari channel Al-Jazeera
are often hailed as models of media with global reach that have
challenged the North Atlantic domination of global news flows and
reference points. These two channels have much in common: they
were both made possible by the large political ambitions of their
founders; both faced indifference or hostility in the world’s power
centers; and both evolved from single channels into multiplatform
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networks. This section explores what can be learned from their
contrasting achievements.

13.4.6.1 TeleSUR
Sponsored by the left-leaning government of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela
(1999–2013), TeleSUR was formed in 2005 as a regional television network with the goal of broadcasting “from the South to the South” (Da
Silva Mendes 2012). TeleSUR’s achievements can only be understood
against the history of media concentration and economic exploitation
achieved by elites in Latin America since the eighteenth century. From
the inception of electronic media, upper classes have controlled the
media and used them to advance their own political and financial
interests, at the exclusion of the interests of working-class majorities.
Through control of commercial and public media, political and economic elites secured ideological control over, and the opportunity to
profit from, mass audiences.
Former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez created TeleSUR as a television network that would prioritize the information and communication
needs of the oppressed majorities in the region and disseminate an
autonomous Latin American perspective. Drawing explicitly from the
language of the NWICO, TeleSUR defines itself as “a Latin American
multimedia initiative dedicated to promoting unity among the peoples
of the South; a space and a voice for the development of a new communication order” (www.teleSURtv.net). It defines “the South” as a
“geopolitical concept that promotes the people’s struggle for peace
and self-
determination and respect for human rights and social
justice.” TeleSUR has had two different goals: to offer an alternative
to US and European news media, (e.g. BBC or CNN); and to shape a
unified Latin American public sphere (Cañizalez and Lugo 2007). It is
not a coincidence that TeleSUR emerged in 2005 at the same time that
the region shifted to the left. Its slogan –“Nuestro norte es el Sur”
(Our North is the South) –embodies this shift in perspective, and is
evidenced by its coverage of key historical events such as the bombardment of Colombian FARC guerrilla camps by the military, or the
demise of Gaddafi’s government in Libya.
TeleSUR is cofinanced by various governments in Latin America (Da
Silva Mendes 2012). Some Latin American analysts suggest that
TeleSUR is more the loudspeaker of “Chavismo” (the political platform
of late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez) than a pan-Latin American
voice (Moraes 2011), but TeleSUR makes an important contribution
to public knowledge: information and news make up 80 percent of
TeleSUR’s programming and the rest centers on renowned Latin
American personalities (Da Silva Mendes 2012; Rincón in press). In
2009 TeleSUR grew into a multimedia platform with a strong presence
online and its own distribution system. TeleSUR currently has five
satellites covering parts of Europe and the Americas, as well as the
Middle East and North Africa.

13.4.6.2 Al-Jazeera
Al-Jazeera, the original Arabic-language channel, was formed in late
1996, following the break-up of BBC Arabic. It was founded by Hamad
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bin-Khalifa Al Thani to free Qatar from the influence of its larger
neighbor, Saudi Arabia, and give the country a regional and global
influence disproportionate to its small size.
Al-Jazeera’s unbridled news coverage quickly offended Arab leaders
accustomed to deference and Western powers unused to having
their narratives of global affairs challenged. By early 2004, the government of Qatar had received more than 500 complaints from Arab
governments focusing on Al-Jazeera (Lamloum 2004: 20). Originally
hailed as a beacon of free speech by the West, Al-Jazeera became
vilified as the loudspeaker of Al-Qaeda following the September 11,
2001 attacks. The channel became a global household name in the
wake of the Anglo-American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in
2001 and 2003, when its deep coverage was reused by Western news
organizations.
In the following years, Al-Jazeera grew from a single channel to a
network of multiple channels, including Al-Jazeera English, a training
center, and online platforms. The Arabic-language Al-Jazeera’s editorial line was sympathetic to the centrist Islamism of the Muslim
Brotherhood, to the Palestinian cause, and to the Global South. Some of
these issues carried over into Al-Jazeera English, whose editorial line has
significant overlap with TeleSUR’s. Al-Jazeera English became a major
global news player, with broadcast bureaus in Doha, London, New York,
and Kuala Lumpur, and dozens of offices and correspondents worldwide. Al-Jazeera, however, faced problems from its inception regarding
repeated political pressure to restrain its editorial line, internal frictions
(Zahreddin 2011), and a conflict between two factions –one secular
and Arab nationalist, the other Islamist and sympathetic to the Muslim
Brotherhood (Kraidy and Khalil 2009; Talon 2011).
Al-Jazeera shifted its editorial line with the onset of the Arab uprisings in
2010. In Egypt, the channel supported the Muslim Brotherhood against
Mubarak. In Syria, it also sided with the rebels against Assad. Although
Al-Jazeera and Qatar gained some ground as a supporter of the
Muslim Brotherhood, ensuing political shifts, driven by rapprochement
between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, undermined Al-Jazeera’s status as a
news outlet that challenged dominant news agendas.
* * * * *
The contrasting cases of TeleSUR and Al-Jazeera illustrate both the
opportunities for and the potential vulnerabilities of attempts to create
public knowledge outlets from outside the Global North that have influence on a global scale. Such outlets can be established and have significant success, provided strong initial funding and support exists, but
they remain vulnerable to the wider political influences that may lie
behind their funding. That vulnerability, however, should not be seen
in isolation from the vulnerabilities to political influence that commercially funded media outlets also face in many other parts of the world.

13.5 Networked Communications: Possibilities
for Citizenship
We have argued in Section 13.4 that media’s potential contribution
to social progress through public knowledge faces significant threats

but, in a digital age characterized by an increasingly global media
infrastructure, brings important opportunities too. In this section, we
consider how citizens make use of the informational and imaginative
materials that media provide to them.

13.5.1 Relations Between Media and Spaces
of Citizenship

13

Today’s new density of global communication not only enables continuous interaction across world regions, but also is beginning to shape
new spheres of civic communication on every scale. Communication
interfaces (from WhatsApp to WeChat) offer a new architecture of
civic discourse that is no longer merely national or international: the
resulting spaces where citizens interact are shaped not by the media
spheres of particular territories but by individuals’ choices of what to
follow online. Furthermore, these networked spheres of civil communication are no longer accessible only in the Global North but engage
citizens –with internet access –from all types of societies, including
so-called failed states. Through this, media become involved in opening
up new spaces of citizenship (SDG 16.7).
Although citizenship is national and the boundedness of state territory continues, communication is shaping a new form of civic identity,
which is increasingly embedded in a globalized digital space. Rather
than globalization operating outside and against the national, “the
nation is the site of globalization” (Sassen 2007: 80, emphasis added).
Today this merging of national and global takes different shapes in
different societies. Even secluded states such as North Korea and
failed states such as Syria, Somalia, and Afghanistan have their own
modes of nation-based globalization. However, the point is particularly
important in relation to public civic communication where national
and global public spheres merge, and public deliberations, legitimacy,
and accountability no longer develop solely through national debates.
Rather, in contexts of climate change, governments are held accountable based on broader global discourses.
As with the history of media (Section 13.2), these developments are still
mainly considered from the perspective of nations in the Global North,
with narratives often not looking beyond Western communications
theory and research (Farivar 2011). Similarly, accounts of diaspora’s
use of media often ignore political connectivity between expatriates of
the Global South that link back to civic discourse in their countries of
origin. The roles of nongovernmental actors in failed states and civic
communications in post-conflict resolution constitute other examples
of new forms of connection between citizens across borders. Citizens
of the Global South such as forced migrants are communicating outside national media territories (Witteborn 2015). Networks of activism,
deliberation, and mobilization, not possible in the past, are emerging
whereby media provide new infrastructures of citizenship as part of
what the MacBride report called the “many voices” of “one world.”
Section 13.2 discussed the historical dominance of communication flows from the Global North, linked to colonial communication
infrastructures and extended by satellite communication infrastructures
emerging in the 1970s for the delivery of broadcasting content and,
since the 1990s, for individual media reception. For most of the
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twentieth century, the globalized “stretching” of human interactions
through media –the “intensification of worldwide social relations
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens
1990: 64) –was, in its framing, dominated by news channels from the
Global North, such as BBC, CNN, and Deutsche Welle, with few opportunities to contest it.
This situation has changed significantly since the second half of the
1990s due to three interrelated processes: the emergence of digital
satellite platforms enabling the delivery of no longer just a few but
hundreds of channels, the reduction of uplink costs for broadcasters, and
the availability of cheap direct-to-home rooftop dishes. Furthermore,
and most importantly, new regional media players have challenged
the monopoly of political “breaking news” in times of world conflict.
Such news is often delivered “live” worldwide and has influenced
national foreign policy imperatives in various countries (Robinson
2005; Volkmer 1999), contesting the framing of world events by media
corporations from the Global North (see also Section 13.4.6). Whereas
CNN produced the only narrative of the first Gulf War (1990–1991) for
a world audience, now there are hundreds of satellite news channels
from the wider Arabic region, from Sudan, Pakistan, Tanzania, and at
least 50 channels dedicated to news from India, South Korea, China,
Mexico, and Brazil. In addition, some region-wide news channels, such
as Channel News Asia and Africa 24, are available in several languages
and target neighboring regions.
The resulting digital ecology for civic participation has two additional
key characteristics. The first is the increasingly complex flow of media
and information organized not just by media organizations, but by
citizens’ own efforts to upload or recirculate what interests them.
It is a transnational public space, which enables a new density of
communication between citizens. The results of such dense peer-to-
peer civic communication may include attempts to influence individuals through hate speech (Phillips 2015), fake news and “bots” (see
IPSP Chapter 10; IPSP Chapter 13 Toolkit “Knowledge as Commons”
Column 2). At the same time, new forms of “reflective interdependence” (Volkmer 2014) may emerge whereby, through the sharing
of reference points across borders, citizens acquire a new basis for
shared political debate or activism on topics ranging from climate
change, human rights violations, and crisis communication to political campaigns such as the “Occupy” movement. Under these new
conditions, civic engagement no longer occurs in one “place,” but
across a network of places.
Although only a minority of the population is engaged in these
new global networks, “their contribution to democracy cannot be
underestimated” (Frere and Kiyindou 2009: 77, 79). In many countries, state monopolies on the inflow of foreign news are no longer
possible. For example, it can be argued that African governments have
“hardly any grip on the choices of the Internet user-consumer, who
can freely choose the information that is interesting or useful and
decide to join a particular ‘virtual community’ ” (Frere and Kiyindou
2009: 78). This flexibility in the resources available through online
media, including information and deliberation accessed across
borders (Bohman 2007), potentially changes citizens’ horizons of civic
engagement.
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13.5.2 New Forms of Communicative Citizenship: The
Case of Global Youth
As an example of these emerging trends, young citizens in many countries are engaging with each other in unprecedented ways, in peer-
to-peer interaction within and across borders. In order to assess the
implications of these new digital ecologies for civic identity, we need
to consider the interaction between local and global media practices
and information flows.
The density of these interactions is revealed in an international comparative study on “Global Youth and Media, Notions of Cosmopolitanism
in the Global Public Space” (discussed in Volkmer 2014). The study
included more than 6,000 young people aged 14–17 in nine countries on five continents. The study asked how they use media, how
they construct globalization, and perceive civic identity. The distinctive
uses of local, national, and global media by particular generations
have been little researched. While national television is the general
population’s preferred medium for political news, young people find
news in parallel ways through Google news, MSN, and Yahoo. Across
all society types, this younger generation mixes local and global information flows in a distinctive way that entitles them to the label of “in-
betweeners.” As a result, they consider themselves between skepticism
and trust, between a realistic appreciation of global risks (indeed a
strong sense of world insecurity) and the need for leadership. When
asked if they feel that the world today has become more insecure
since their parents were young, 80 percent agree. Yet more than half
consider international political events more important than national
and so seem to live out their citizenship on two connected scales,
national and global. They distrust politicians and engage in global political spheres characterized by global themes such as “environment,”
“human rights,” and “economy, wealth, and poverty.”
A Mexican sociologist describes in the context of Central America the
implications of such an engagement for local citizenship: “the protest movements with a global reach, and the presence of leadership
of young people in them, bring to mind the emergence of a new political cosmopolitanism among youth. Its native land is the world, and
its strength lies in its (seeming) absence of structure, its intermittence
and the multiple nodes in which its utopia is anchored” (Reguillo
2009: 34). In this analysis Central America’s young generation is both
“disconnected and unequal” and “well situated, connected, and
globalized” and increasingly engaged in national and transnational
youth publics (Reguillo 2009: 23). Other regions provide further evidence of youth agency converging around local networks of publicity
in Cairo (Arvizu 2009: 387), Tanzania (Tufte and Enghel 2009), and
Chile (Munoz-Navarro 2009). In Kenya and other parts of the Global
South, media provide platforms for youth to interact and participate in
political debates worldwide, leading one analyst to comment that, for
the Kenyan diaspora, social media is an “integral aspect [of] Kenya’s
social and political dynamics” (Mukhongo 2014: 325).
However, the implications of these emerging forms of public engagement in regional media cultures require more attention. For example,
in Central Asia, urban youth are drawing increasingly on global sources
of information and so “are increasingly judging the worldviews and
behaviours of parents, teachers, political elites and other traditional
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authority figures against that global context … they are suddenly able
to compare themselves with anyone, anywhere” (Ibold 2010: 532).
As anticipated by Joshua Meyrowitz three decades ago (Meyrowitz
1985), but now on a global, not national, scale, media flows can work
to challenge knowledge barriers and destabilize relations between
generations, so forging new bases for civic identity and action.

13.5.3 Case Study: Connectivity and Social Progress
in a Chinese Heritage Village
The world’s rural population is at its largest ever today, even though
the world’s urban population is (slightly) larger. An understanding
of rural connectivity and its relation to social progress is therefore
indispensable. Located in the mountainous interior region of China’s
coastal Zhejiang Province, Heyang has a population of 3,670 and
more than 1,100 years of history. It is a quintessential embodiment
of China’s agrarian civilization. Its well-preserved Ming-Qing era traditional architecture earned it a place in 2013 in the Chinese State
Council’s list of key sites of national cultural relics. However, this is
also a modernized and globalized village: with part of its economy
integrated into global circuits of production and more than half of its
labor force now working outside the village (most of whom only return
briefly to reunite with family during festival periods).
Village communications also cut across the traditional and the modern.
The oral tradition remains strong: the village’s Senior Center and popular
street corners serve as sites of information and gossip exchange. Public
announcements are posted at centrally located information boards
and walls at different village corners. However, the village’s lineage
book, started more than 600 years ago by a Ming-Dynasty official from
the village, issued its sixteenth edition in December 2016 with a grand
ceremony. The book contains biographies of notable individuals and
registers the names of all male descendants (female descendants were
first recorded in its fifteenth edition, compiled in 1995).
Wired radio and communal film projection were the most popular
forms of mediated communication and entertainment during the
1970s and early 1980s. Along with village assemblies, these low-tech
forms of communication played pivotal roles in Mao-era political
mobilization and cultural integration. Their embeddedness in communal life was instrumental to their success in linking villagers to the
outside world and sustaining village cohesion. Starting, however, from
the late 1980s, information reception and entertainment have become
privatized and personalized. As villagers are exposed to wider and
more diverse media flows, many feel more isolated from each other.
Social stratification and income polarization, following the dismantling
of the collective economy, have engendered a further sense of social
dislocation and community disintegration.
The 1990s saw the village’s further leap into the digital age: automated
direct dial telephone started in 1990; cable television and analogue
mobile telephony arrived in 1994 and by 1997, digital mobile telephony. Today, Heyang is among the 150,000 Chinese villages with
broadband access (in 2015 China’s State Council promised a 98 percent village broadband access rate by 2020). While desktop computers
are rare, telephones, especially mobile phones, are widely used, but
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only the young and economically better-off have smartphones to
connect themselves to the Internet.
In between lies a wide spectrum of communication patterns and
circuits of connectivity that have made Heyang a small-scale model
of China’s highly stratified society. Square dancers in the village, for
example, have used their smartphones to download videos of the
latest dancing styles, in this way imagining themselves as part of a
larger national dance community. A small minority, like their urban
middle-class counterparts, engage in online stock trade. Wechat, the
most popular Chinese social media platform, is popular among village
elites, the young, and the economically well-off. One member of the
Village Council has more than a dozen Wechat friend circles, with
relatives, businessmen originally from the village, government officials,
and students of Heyang’s culture. However, with inclusion also comes
exclusion: such Wechat friend circles are limited to this member’s own
professional and interpersonal networks, and so exclude the majority
of villagers. Moreover, her Wechat communications are mostly externally directed, aiming at promoting Heyang as a tourist site, rather than
at fellow villagers. Meanwhile, with the higher cost of a digital cable
subscription, some poorer villagers have given up on cable television
service altogether to opt for satellite television, which only requires the
one-time purchasing cost of a satellite receiving dish. But such satellite
television services do not include local municipal and county television
channels. Consequently, these households end up with no access to
local television news.

13

As a result, many local residents, especially those in the lower social
strata, complain about their lack of communication with village leaders,
lack of effective participation in village affairs, and a general sense of
powerlessness in shaping the village’s future. Caught in a complex web
of local governance, land appropriation, village renovation, and tourist
development, villagers resort to protests and blockages of village construction projects to communicate their demands and frustrations. In
one case, in an attempt to make their voices heard, some residents
refused to allow a CCTV crew to film their residential courtyard for
the 2015 Spring Festival Gala; others have tried to derail the village’s
lineage book compilation project. A few villagers have also expressed
a desire for the return of a village wired radio system and Mao-era
face-to-face meetings of the village community as a whole.
But China’s “great digital leap forward” has not created upwardly
mobile opportunities for all. X. Zhu, a 24-year-old Heyang village
youth, grew up in a well-off family with postsecondary education, but
did not live to see a future in Heyang. He arranged his own suicide
through the Internet in early 2010. Another 24-year-old netizen came
all the way from Yunan Province in southwestern China to commit suicide together with Zhu. Theirs is one of the saddest stories of digital
connectivity in the Network Age.

13.5.4 Networked Communications Among East Asian
Precarious Workers
Networked communications offer opportunities in many countries for
new forms of political and social connection, which may be especially
important in spreading public knowledge where public broadcasting
543

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 16 Sep 2019 at 22:52:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399647.006

544

545

Chapter 13

systems are under threat (see Section 13.4). But this opportunity may
occur in the context of social conditions, particularly labor markets,
where ICTs are intensifying the deterioration of working conditions and
sustaining new structures of precarious labor (SDG 8.8). The resulting
balance for social progress may therefore be highly ambiguous, and
Northeast Asia offers an important example of these tensions.

13

The mobile phone has become deeply entangled with the precarious
labor culture in Northeast Asia. Mobile communication technology
has intersected with the emergence of increasingly insecure working
conditions, particularly those of young Northeast Asian workers, who are
situated within the “institutionalized precariousness” of a dual economy
made up of a large reserve army “with no employment prospects, no
future, [and] no plans” (Bourdieu 1998: 30f.), alongside a small privileged
minority of secure workers with a regular wage. A “mobile precariat”
(precarious workers who use mobile phones to sustain their living within
an always-on-call working culture)24 suffers from chronically insecure
job positions as temporary staff or contract workers: they are trapped
at the bottom of the pay scale, yet at the same time remain connected
through media to the workplace (Qiu 2009). This mobile precariat is
disadvantaged not only through the labor exploitation they endure, but
also when it comes to seeking remedies for these injustices (see Seo and
Kim 2009; Shaviro 2002 for important studies).
Employers’ attitudes vary to mobile phone use among their precarious
workers. Whereas in Japan and Taiwan, workers must leave their phones
behind, beyond their reach, when they start work, in South Korea, where
the conditions for workers are extremely insecure with the second
longest working hours among OECD countries (2,124 hours/year as of
2014),25 mobile phones are allowed at work. However, in all countries,
possessing a mobile phone renders precarious workers vulnerable to a
wider culture of surveillance. Many employers monitor their workers’
lives outside of formal working hours by using mobile instant messaging services (KakaoTalk in Korea; WeChat in China; Line in Japan and
Taiwan). Transgressing the normal boundaries of work, employers use
phones to issue orders to their precarious workers on matters such as
cleanliness, service management, and the employee code of conduct.
The outcomes are, however, unstable. In South Korea, young precarious workers have attempted to stir public opinion against unjust
business practices, by posting images and chat messages on social
media platforms. They, in turn, have been disciplined through remote
monitoring on live surveillance mobile apps and mobile instant messaging. In Japan, there have been on-and offline protests against “black
companies,” notorious for exploiting precarious workers, with workers
using the Internet and social media to disclose their unfair treatment in
the workplace and share it with others. Given the collapse of the public
broadcasting system in Japan, online citizen journalism and alternative journalism have also offered platforms for building alternative
understandings of social justice in the workplace that go beyond the
agendas of mainstream media.
In summary, Northeast Asia offers a clear example of how the mobile
phone as an infrastructure of connection has become a new technique
24
25
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for regulating labor in an always-on-call culture, yet continues to offer
opportunities for movements for social justice and social progress.

13.6 Struggles for Social Justice Through the
Democratization of Media
Having in Sections 13.4 and 13.5 considered how the outputs of media
contribute variously to new forms of social connection and environments of public knowledge –two preconditions for action towards
social progress –we turn in this section to the new social issues raised
by the increasingly complex governance structures for media and
communications outlined in Section 13.3. We first place those issues
within the context of a longer-term struggle for media reform.

13.6.1 The Longer History of Democratizing Media
The expansion of media infrastructures into ever wider areas of life
through digital platforms has generated new types of media activism
(Milan 2016). Across the Global South and the Global North, today’s
media activists fight struggles on diverse fronts. However, popular
attempts to shape media infrastructures into more democratic and
inclusive social institutions did not begin with the media activists of
the twenty-first century.
Just as media infrastructures have developed differently in each nation
and region of the world (see Section 13.2), so efforts to reshape and
reform the media are varied. Before the consolidation of the advertising-supported commercial press, radical working-class publications
in the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada emerged to challenge
the dominant press order (Hackett and Zhao 1998). With the rise of
electronic communication, US media activists in the 1920s and 1930s
demanded public ownership of the telegraph and noncommercial radio
(McChesney 1993; Stein 2009). In Russia and China, communist and
nationalist revolutionaries established alternative media systems as
part of their attempts to seek social progress through anticapitalistic
and nationalistic struggles; the resulting media structures, however,
degenerated into ossified state-controlled systems. Nevertheless, antiestablishment communication forms (underground tabloids and samizdat in Russia; the big-character posters on China’s Democracy Wall)
testified to the radical democratic communication impulse of these
post-revolutionary societies.
In the 1960s and 1970s, civil rights movements in the United States
and Canada responded to poor media coverage of their struggles for
social justice by demanding more access to the mainstream media, and
developing their own media (Stein 2009). The battle around cable television regulation in these countries was one of the most salient victories
of media reform movements, as cable companies are now mandated to
establish community and educational channels free of charge (Halleck
2001) (SPI “Access to basic knowledge”). In Latin America, in response
to the brutal dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, grassroots groups
developed their own underground communication networks in a long

Also known as Alba [알바] in South Korea, [xin gong ren 新工人] in China, and Freeter [furita フリーター] in Japan.
OECD.StatExtract, 2016.
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battle to pressure states to democratize the media (Rodríguez and
Murphy 1997). Meanwhile, in several European countries, pirate radio
was the precursor of later struggles for media regulation that guarantees space for public and community media (Jankowski, Prehn, and
Stappers 1992).

infrastructures no less profound than that called for urban governance
in Chapter 5. We turn for the rest of this section to specific struggles
that target the underlying communications infrastructure of the digital
age and its increasingly complex needs for governance.

In 1976, in one of the earliest global efforts to democratize the media,
Amadou Mathar M’Bow, Director of UNESCO, appointed a commission
of 16 experts to examine global communication problems. The
commission’s final report, known as the MacBride Report, described
shocking information inequalities between First and Third World countries (UNESCO 1980). The report documented high levels of media
concentration in a few transnational media corporations mostly
located in rich, industrialized countries. Such concentration had many
damaging consequences including highly unequal information flows
between rich and poor countries; a lack of diversity among the voices
and sources of information and communication; and a flow of media
content from the North to the South that threatened the latter’s local
cultures. The MacBride Report argued that a New World Information
and Communication Order was urgently necessary.

13.6.2 Transparency and Accountability of Media
Infrastructures and Mediated Data Flows

Efforts towards a NWICO, including recommendations for national
communication policies, reduced media concentration, more South-
to-South communication channels, and a mass media code of ethics,
embroiled UNESCO in a high-profile dispute with the United States,
who interpreted the report’s recommendations as a threat to “freedom
of the press,” defined within the liberal framework as freedom from
government control. In 2003, the Communication Rights for the
Information Society Campaign (CRIS) emerged as a new moment
of global media reform. The CRIS Campaign, which still continues,
encompasses four pillars of communication rights: the right to participate in the public sphere; the right to knowledge; civil rights in communication; and cultural rights in communication (Siochrú 2005).
The first two decades of the twenty-first century have been marked
by UNESCO‘s efforts to protect journalists and defend freedom of
expression. The UN Human Rights Council’s “Resolution on the
Safety of Journalists” (2016) is welcome, but does not yet extend to
Russia and China. In 2015, Member States endorsed the concept of
“internet universality” which includes four principles for internet governance: human rights, openness, accessibility, and multistakeholder
participation (UNESCO 2015).
Looking back over the past four decades, international governmental
organizations and media activists have broadened their platforms
and struggles to include communications as an important dimension of social progress. As Laura Stein notes: “communication policy
activism spans the gamut from representational concerns with the end
products of communication to the deep-seated political, economic,
regulatory, and infrastructural issues that shape the larger cultural
environment” (Stein 2009: 2–3). At stake in this continued battle is a
foundational change in the governance of media and communications
26
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The last decade has seen the emergence of increasing global concern
about the transparency and accountability of media infrastructures
and the data flows that they carry (SDG 9; SPI “Access to information and communications”). In some cases, those concerns have
prompted popular protests and engendered new forms and sites of
resistance. One important category of concern about transparency and
accountability relates to the conditions of access to information online.
Populations worldwide have begun to pay attention to the effects of
private agreements for preferential treatment that, behind the scenes,
structure the universe of information they see (IPSP 2017).
Initially, struggles over preferential treatment took the form of efforts
to secure formal enactment of the principle of “network neutrality.”
Proponents of network neutrality argued that internet access providers
should treat all content, sites, and services equally without discriminating among different sources, services, or providers, while internet
access providers sought greater leeway to experiment with differential
quality of service. For the most part, countries around the world have
resolved this debate in favor of network neutrality, although European
regulations create a preferential exemption for certain specialized,
high-bandwidth services.26 Since there is no reason to believe that
unregulated markets by themselves will preserve anything like network neutrality, this issue is likely to remain important for media’s
positive contribution to public knowledge.
Formal regulatory adoption of network neutrality mandates, however,
has not resolved disputes about preferential access, but has simply
shifted the terrain. Worldwide, regulatory implementation of network
non-discrimination mandates has often been followed by so-called
“zero-
rating” initiatives. Zero-
rating refers to an arrangement by
which an internet access provider or mobile services provider agrees
to exempt a particular content service from the data caps otherwise
imposed on its users. Such agreements may be made in return for flat
payments or in return for access to data about the behavior of users as
they use the zero-rated service. Zero-rating agreements tend to drive
traffic toward exempted data services, to the advantage of those providing them, so indirectly challenging the net neutrality principle.
A second important category of transparency and accountability issues
relates to targeted removal of online information. Such removal may
be mandated or initiated by an information intermediary (for example,
a platform company). It may also involve the threatened (or feared)
assertion of intellectual property rights, a request for removal, or

For the US regulation, see “Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet,” 80 Fed. Reg. 19,737 (April 13, 2015). For the European Union regulation, see Regulation 2015/2120
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks
within the Union, L 301/1.
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de-indexing in connection with rights afforded under data protection
regulation, enforcement of privately defined acceptable-content policies, or direct state censorship. Because the failure to remove some
types of information can itself raise justice issues, targeted removal
may sometimes be appropriate. Very often, however, such content
filtering mechanisms remain secretive and unaccountable. Concerns
about secret and unaccountable content filtering have sparked
protests around the world, resulting in a new model of activism that
takes digital media simultaneously as a site and target of protest
activity. Such activity has achieved political gains, but arguably also
accelerated the shift toward corporatized governance (described in
Section 13.3.2).
In the United States, a protest movement that originated domestically and then spread globally defeated proposed legislation that tried
to impose content filtering obligations on domain name registrars and
payment providers (Herman 2013). Subsequently, however, major US
payment providers have acceded to a set of voluntary “best practices”
that involves them more actively in private intellectual property enforcement (Bridy 2015). In Australia, a popular protest movement opposed
a government proposal that would have required internet service
providers to perform mandatory content filtering; the government eventually withdrew the proposal after political opposition proved firm, and
after the major Australian ISPs voluntarily agreed to block 1,400 sites
previously identified as child pornography purveyors.27 In China, where
state involvement in filtering and suppression of dissident or otherwise
disfavored expression is more direct, protest movements have taken
correspondingly more indirect forms that involve the use of seemingly
innocuous code words to discuss forbidden topics (Link and Xiao 2013).
Anticensorship and “internet freedom” activists have developed new,
crowd-
sourced methods of discovering and documenting content
removal efforts and actions, producing websites such as chillingeffects.
org, a US-based site that catalogues copyright takedown notices, and
onlinecensorship.org, a project by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
that catalogues content removals by social media sites. Some global
platform companies, such as Twitter and Google, have begun to disseminate information about various types of targeted removals (e.g.
Google’s “transparency report”), although they have been much less
forthcoming about their own acceptable-content protocols.
A final set of concerns about transparency and accountability relates
to processes of automated, algorithmically processed mediation and
filtering. Many dominant market providers –Google and Baidu in
search, Facebook in social networking, Twitter in microblogging –use
predictive algorithms to structure the universe of information that
users see, and network neutrality mandates do not address those
practices. Such algorithms operate invisibly to create displays to users
that are tailored to what is known or inferred about that user. To individual users, however, the displays may appear universal and neutral.
As we noted in Section 13.3, there are important, unresolved issues
concerning the accountability of such automated filtering.
27
28
29
30

Media and Communications

13.6.3 New Concentrations of Power Via Media
Infrastructures and Mediated Data Flows
The new concentrations of power exerted via media infrastructures
and mediated data flows have themselves generated rising levels of
concern, prompting activism by civil society groups and sometimes
more widespread protests and struggles (SDG 9).
One important cluster of issues involves proprietary claims to information networks and resources. Even as digital media activists and
civil society groups have pushed for greater legal freedom to store,
share, and modify content online, law enforcement authorities around
the world have pushed to make outlaws of individuals and businesses
who facilitate file-
sharing. Enforcement has proceeded both via
highly publicized litigation and by off-the-record efforts to seize or
block access to internet domains (McCourt and Burkart 2003; Palmer
and Warren 2013; see also Bridy 2015). In addition, as discussed in
Section 13.3.2, both nation-
states and powerful corporate actors
have sought enhanced intellectual property protection through trade
agreements. In Europe, popular opposition to the prospect of stepped-
up intellectual property enforcement defeated ratification of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which had been negotiated with the
United States, Japan, and other countries. However, many provisions
for enhanced enforcement have appeared in a different agreement,
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (which was signed in 2016 but has not
entered into force) (Public Citizen 2015b). Less is known about another
agreement, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, now
under negotiation between the United States and Europe.
Another set of issues relating to power exerted through today’s fast-
changing media infrastructures involves the surveillance conducted
by powerful third parties, such as nation-states (IPSP 2017). In the
wake of the revelations by Edward Snowden about the extent of the
US National Security Administration’s surveillance of global electronic
communications, both ordinary citizens and governments worldwide
protested NSA’s lawless and seemingly unconstrained behavior. The
Snowden revelations, however, also showed that national security services in multiple jurisdictions –including some of those now protesting
most loudly –cooperated with the NSA and with each other, helping to
form a network for evading existing domestic procedures for oversight
(Privacy International 2013).28
Resistance to those efforts has taken varied forms. Some experts in
computer security have formed ventures to develop and market secure
“black phones” and online tools, while others have helped activists
and civil society groups to explore, understand, and expose the full
range of lawful and unlawful government surveillance activity.29 As
described in Section 13.3, some large information companies also
have actively resisted the expansion of government surveillance. One
country, Iceland, has resolved to develop comprehensive legislation
establishing itself as a safe harbor for whistleblowers and investigative journalists.30

See Ramadge (2008) and Charette (2012).
See MacAskill and Ball (2013).
See Laskow (2014), Rinehart (2015), Schneier, Seidel, and Vijayakumar (2016).
International Modern Media Institute, “IMMI Resolution.” https://en.immi.is/immi-resolution/.
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Civil society organizations and, more recently, frustrated legislators,
have put sustained pressure on trade negotiators to make treaty
processes more transparent and democratically accountable.31 New
political movements and parties have formed around platforms for
access to information and free culture (Beyer 2014), and the free/libre/
open source software (FLOSS) movement has worked to foster the
development and adoption of open systems that may be freely used
and adapted (Coleman 2013; Gamalielsson and Lundell 2014).
A third cluster of struggles involves efforts by privacy activists and
researchers to mobilize civil society groups and the public against
commercial information power. This struggle needs to be understood
within a wider diagnosis of contemporary media infrastructures’ central role in the emergence of a new form of surveillance capitalism,
whereby populations worldwide comprise a source of raw materials
for new practices of surplus extraction (Cohen 2015; Zuboff 2015).
Disputes over these questions are as widely varied as the contexts and
population groups involved. In the United States and Europe, commercial surveillance practices have engendered legal struggles over
behavioral credit monitoring, drawing attention to the role of predictive profiling in the high-risk lending practices that contributed to
the global financial crisis of 2008 (Pasquale 2015). Meanwhile, in an
effort to enlist users themselves in both frustrating and exposing the
practices of surveillance capitalism, teams of researchers have worked
to design new privacy tools, such as ad blockers and tracker visualization tools (Eaglehardt and Narayanan 2016; Kennedy 2016).
In the Global South, struggles over the spread of surveillance capitalism
have involved challenges to public–private partnerships for the delivery
of services. In India, debates concerning the possible uses of a new
national identification number have proved sharply divisive. In 2015, the
Indian government launched the Digital India Initiative, which is based
on the use of the Aadhar Unique Identity (UID) scheme for biometric
authentication of recipients of government benefits and services. The
Aadhar scheme, which is the world’s largest biometrics-based database
initiative, was developed by corporate technology partners, and critics
charge that too little is known about its capabilities and potential future
uses (see also the India case study in Section 13.6.4).32 In sub-Saharan
Africa, questions have been raised about the undisclosed uses of data
collected via privately funded mobile telephony and banking initiatives
(Hosein and Nyst 2013; Taylor 2016a; Taylor and Broeders 2015).
More generally, in the international development context, attention to
data protection questions has highlighted how routine practices of data
collection and sharing can put local populations at risk (Taylor 2016b)
(SPI “Private rights”). There is a deep, if rarely noticed, continuity
between these recent debates about control of networked information
flows and the struggles of indigenous peoples against broadcasters for
many decades. For example, Australia’s Aboriginal communities have
developed protocols that regulate how media makers –both individual
media producers and media industries –can proceed on Aboriginal
31

32
33
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lands and among Aboriginal communities (Janke 1999; West 2014).
Any individual producer or media industry intending to operate
among Aboriginal communities must gain clearances from Aboriginal
custodians before capturing, disseminating, reproducing, or archiving
data about the land or the people. By defining a framework of respect,
integrity, authenticity, and consultation with Aboriginal authorities and
custodians, Aboriginal protocols have sought to ensure media accountability. Far from seeing such protocols as part of a “local culture” that
unhelpfully resists “progress” (compare IPSP Chapter 15), we need
to look to them as precursors of the fundamental changes needed in
the governance of data flows. But no such protocols have yet been
developed to govern data flows in the wider development context.

13

13.6.4 Case Study: Civil Society Activism in
India: Facebook Free Basics33
Recent events in India offer an example of the ability of civil society
activism to challenge the power of global digital platforms. We will
focus here particularly on Facebook’s proposed introduction of its
“Free Basics” platform for internet access, but will situate the struggle
over Free Basics in the broader context of other disputes over information rights in India in recent years.
Facebook’s Free Basics platform is a joint private–public partnership
ostensibly committed to expanding internet access for first-time users
of the Internet in select countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.
Facebook’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, launched the initiative in 2013 (originally branded as Internet.org) in partnership with Samsung, Ericsson,
MediaTek, Opera Software, Nokia, and Qualcomm. It was based on an
“app” that enables smartphone users limited, free access to certain
sites and services on the Internet, and that is designed to function on
less robust 2G networks, potentially encouraging users to subscribe to
mobile access packages (Hemple 2016).
From the Indian government’s perspective, Free Basics represented an
opportunity to expand its digital footprint into the daily lives of Indian
citizens, by integrating Free Basics within its flagship Digital India initiative (discussed in Section 13.6.2). The Indian PM Narendra Modi’s
attempts to use social media including Twitter, Facebook, Youtube,
Instagram, and other platforms for political purposes are well known
(Pal, Chandra, and Vydiswaran 2016). In September 2015, he met Mark
Zuckerberg in Silicon Valley, California (Mukherjee 2015). For Facebook,
signing India to Free Basics would have given Facebook unrivalled
access to the members of its second largest market (125 million users).
The deal was celebrated on Facebook with both Modi’s and Zuckerberg’s
profile pictures wrapped in the green, orange, and white of the Indian
flag, leading millions of users to update their profiles with the tri-color.
Civil society activists, however, viewed Free Basics as an attempt by
a commercial vendor to tether users to its product and monopolize
the terms of access to the wider Internet, so compromising the tenets

Perhaps as a result, some provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s intellectual property chapter are less draconian than they had been in earlier, leaked versions of the
proposed text. See Cox (2015).
See Dreze (2015), Kakkar (2010), Masiero (2014), Punj (2012). See also Section 13.6.3.
Case study written by Pradip Thomas.
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of network neutrality (discussed in Section 13.6.2). While civil society
groups in India had previously advocated specific reforms such as
banning software patents and support for free and open source software (FOSS), a new “Save the Internet” campaign mobilized millions
of users to petition the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to
uphold the broad principle of network neutrality. Facebook was completely caught off guard by the extent of the mobilization of Indian civil
society in India against Free Basics.
In February 2016, the TRAI acted to uphold the principle of network
neutrality. TRAI’s regulation, titled “Prohibition of Discriminatory
Tariffs for Data Services Regulation” provides that “no service provider shall offer or charge discriminatory tariffs for data services on
the basis of content.” TRAI’s response was surprising given its previous support for industry interests over those of civil society (Abraham
2016). Additionally, while trade bodies such as the Cellular Operators
Association of India (COAI) supported “differential pricing,” others
such as the National Association for Software and Services Companies
(NASSCOM) opposed it.
This episode, which illustrates both the potential for cozy, mutually
beneficial relationships between global platform companies and
nation-state governments and the ability of civil society to challenge
such relationships, needs to be put in the broader context of grassroots
struggle for information rights in India in recent years (SPI “Access to
information and communications”). Campaigns spearheaded by individuals such as Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey and organizations such as
the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information led to the
Indian government enacting the Right to Information Act in 2005. Such
campaigns, along with a variety of social movements for information
rights, created a broader recognition of the need for knowledge of
entitlements and rights, facilitated access to information, and transparency and accountability in the disbursement of public funds.
This broad Right to Information movement laid the foundations for the
subsequent struggles not only against Facebook‘s Free Basics initiative
but also against the Aadhar Unique Identity (UID) scheme (discussed
in Section 13.6.3). A number of the organizations that contested
Free Basics also contest the Aadhar initiative. They have consistently
highlighted shortfalls in the collection of biometric data, the security,
and authentication issues that surround a centralized database on
citizens, the potential for misuse of private information and for mass
surveillance of citizens, and the absence of privacy laws. While the government has defended the scheme as a means to combat benefit fraud
and protect national security, critics highlighted successfully the threat
to basic freedoms from this expansion of the digital infrastructure.

13.6.5 Normative Implications of Media Infrastructures
and Mediated Data Flows
The developments discussed in this section raise three broad sets of
normative implications: for autonomy, economic justice, and political
self-determination.
First and most basically, new and unaccountable concentrations of
power exerted via media infrastructures and mediated data flows

Media and Communications

have implications for individual autonomy. As media infrastructures
become more pervasive in everyday life, they increasingly mediate
the human experience of the self, the other, and the world. As they
connect individuals and communities, they also structure the universe
of information and personalize informational exposure. The dynamics
of continual, feedback-
driven personalization invest information
intermediaries with enormous power over processes of individual
self-determination, which in a less intensively mediated world have
been much more open textured and amenable to serendipity (Cohen
2012). Since individual autonomy is a necessary element of any form
of social progress, it is essential to consider the implications of such
large-scale media-based developments for the ongoing goal of social
progress.
Second, as described in Section 13.3.3, the emergence of new economic models based on surveillance, social sorting, and predictive
profiling has implications for economic justice (SDG 9). The necessary frameworks for protective regulation against such forms of data
extraction are incompletely developed and unevenly implemented.
Moreover, as privacy activists and civil society organizations worldwide have worked to raise public awareness of surveillance and its
threats to privacy, they have struggled against an antiregulatory discourse that aims to defeat protective regulation by linking surveillance
tightly with a generalized innovation imperative (Cohen 2016).
Finally, commercial and government practices of surveillance, social
sorting, and predictive profiling have profound implications for political self-
determination. The basic possibilities for political self-
determination are important not just for political processes themselves,
but also for wider processes of human development, richly understood
(Sen 1999). Yet there is mounting evidence that predictive algorithms
can be used to alter user behavior, in ways that implicate values of
democratic self-governance and the rule of law. Facebook has publicly
acknowledged conducting experiments on how personalization of the
content in newsfeeds can affect users’ moods and other experiments
reminding users to go to the polls and vote (Grimmelmann 2015).
There is no guarantee that future experiments would be disclosed, nor
is Facebook subject to ethical guidelines similar to those that constrain
human-
subject experimentation in other contexts. Google’s chief
economist similarly has characterized Google’s user base as subjects
for experimentation (Varian 2014).
The prospect that large information intermediaries may enjoy wholly
unaccountable power to manipulate the flows of social and public
knowledge is alarming. More generally, the continuous, immanent,
and highly granular regulatory processes by which such privately controlled intermediaries exert power via media infrastructures (and the
new discourse of human development through the exploitation of
“big data” that helps legitimate such power) exist in tension with
broadly shared commitments to due process and the rule of law
(Hildebrandt 2015).
We end this section with an important case where the broad social
justice issues raised by the governance of media and communications
infrastructures entered the political domain: the civil-society based
NETmundial initiative that emerged in Brazil in the wake of the
Snowden revelations.
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13.6.6 Case Study: Brazil’s Marco Civil on Internet
Governance34
After the Snowden scandal of 2013 revealed mass electronic surveillance and espionage by US intelligence agencies, diverse global
initiatives to defend the freedom of the Internet emerged from civil
society. At the time of writing, the most progressive regulatory framework for the Internet is Marco Civil da Internet (Civil Rights Framework
for the Internet), an initiative developed jointly by Brazil’s civil society
and the former government of Dilma Rousseff. Unlike authoritarian
states who show greater concern over the implications of the Internet
for regime stability than for freedom, and unlike liberal democracies in North America and Europe –who fear increased state control and often defer to private, corporatized governance of media
infrastructures –Brazil supports universal free internet, while being
also critical of the international governance structures that guide it
(Trinkunas and Wallace 2015: 2). The Marco Civil is an exemplar of
alternative ways of thinking about internet governance and its relation to wider social justice, without claiming that, by itself, a regulatory framework can create a different type of internet infrastructure,
let alone address all the issues of power to which any communications
infrastructure gives rise.
The Marco Civil sought to rethink what freedom and citizenship
mean when it comes to the Internet. Adopted on April 23, 2014, the
Civil Rights Framework is intended as a prototype for Internet regulation globally. The Marco Civil emerged from NETmundial, a conference convened by Brazil’s national internet steering committee and
organized as a multi-
stakeholder dialogue between government,
industry, and civil society. The framework that became the Marco Civil
was developed through a series of online and offline deliberations that
invited Brazilian citizens to shape a legal framework for internet regulation. It is significant not only as an initiative born from civil society
in dialogue with government and private sectors, but also as a proposal emerging from the Global South, framed by social movements
committed to the idea of communication rights. The Marco Civil has
the potential to act as a balance to the global power of the United
States on internet governance issues.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet advances the
commitment to respect for civil rights as an important component of
internet regulation and governance. Recognizing the vulnerability of
users, the Marco Civil emphasizes the Internet’s social goals, protects
the rights of internet users, and proposes the adoption of open source
technologies that allow free access to information, knowledge, and
culture. In the eyes of civil society activists (Gutiérrez 2014), the most
important achievements of Brazil’s Marco Civil include protection of
freedom and privacy, open governance, universal inclusion, cultural
diversity, and network neutrality.
The Marco Civil considers access to the Internet fundamental to
democracy, as it is essential for participation in political life and cultural production, and part of the right to education and freedom of
expression. It therefore advocates reducing inequalities in access to
digital technologies and promotes the development of competencies
34
35
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to use digital platforms effectively. It proposes universal internet service with controlled rates and sufficient connection speed and also
promotes education on the rights of consumers, ethical consumerism,
and protection against misleading advertising and deceptive business
methods (Compare SPI “Access to basic knowledge”).
The Marco Civil stipulates that, while internet providers are free to
compete, they are also responsible for guaranteeing freedom of
speech, freedom of access to information, net neutrality, and protection of privacy. The Marco Civil forbids any type of discrimination based
on disability, sexual orientation, or political or religious affiliations. It
also provides for the protection of users’ data and reputation and the
right to the free development of personality,35 and guarantees the
right to access information and the right to rectification (SPI “Access
to information and communications”). The Marco Civil states that citizens should be encouraged to move from being mere consumers of
information, knowledge, and culture to becoming content creators. The
framework calls for the development of appropriate digital tools to
facilitate the creation of information, knowledge, and culture by citizens and states that the Internet should promote the production and
circulation of such local content. Not surprisingly therefore movements
that defend the freedom of knowledge strongly support this new code,
to which Brazil’s free software community was a principal contributor
(Gutiérrez 2014). As initially proposed, the Marco Civil also mandated
that all information and content about Brazil should be archived in
Brazil, but that restriction was removed following lobbying by transnational internet corporations. Ultimately, the Marco Civil provided
that all Brazilian internet content or content about Brazil is considered
“Brazilian” and can be the object of observation. The Marco Civil
eliminates criminal copyright penalties for content usage by citizens.
However, it recognizes civil copyright laws that limit access to digital
content and hinder collaborative creation, in tension with the goal of
an entirely free digital culture.

13

The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet mandates network neutrality (discussed in Section 13.6.2), and prohibits discriminatory action against any type of content or user, either by changing
the speed of transmission or restricting content. Network neutrality
ensures that all data travels at the same speed and without any
restrictions based on the nature of the content or the nature of the
user. Brazil’s Marco Civil forbids blocking, monitoring, filtering, or analyzing content for commercial, political, moral, religious, or ideological
reasons. The principle of network neutrality is here affirmed as essential to a collaborative and democratic digital culture.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework proposes a model of governance
through multi-stakeholder, transparent, collaborative, and democratic
mechanisms. The creators of the Marco Civil hoped to inspire activists
and civil society organizations in other countries to demand similar
laws (Gutierrez 2014), proposing “a global Internet that promotes
freedom, inclusion, and diversity” (Trinkunas and Wallace 2015: 37).
The code’s provisions were in many cases opposed by global platform
companies and sometimes defeated. It remains too early to determine
the long-term influence of the model proposed, but its significance as
an alternative to standard models of governance remains.

Case study written by Omar Rincón.
Compare the similar “right to free development of [the] personality” recognized in German law: Article 2 of the Grundgesetz.
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13.7 Struggles for Social Justice Through Media
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We come in this final main section of the chapter to consider the distinctive role that media and communications play in struggles for
social justice and those struggles’ overall contribution to social progress. The transformation of media infrastructures in the final decades
of the twentieth century gave rise to new communication ecologies,
which enabled divergent worldviews and political interests to draw
on a multitude of media resources in their struggles for social justice.

13.7.1 Appropriating the Digital
Individuals and communities around the world have learned to appropriate media, especially digital communications infrastructures. The
most notable late twentieth-century case of appropriating media for
social justice was provided by the Zapatistas in Mexico.
In 1994, just as Mexico was preparing to sign the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada,
the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) (Zapatista Army
of National Liberation), an indigenous guerrilla organization, abruptly
came to national attention by seizing towns in the region of Chiapas
and demanding land, work, food, housing, education, independence,
freedom, justice, and peace for Mexico’s indigenous communities. The
Mexican government attempted to annihilate the EZLN before news of
the group reached the global public sphere but did not succeed. The
EZLN’s resistance has been analyzed from many perspectives, but in
this chapter its importance lies not in its general repertoire of activism,
but more as an exemplar of how, in the late twentieth century, media
and culture came to be appropriated in new ways by social justice
movements.
Using diverse media technologies and strategies, the Zapatistas
activated a communication network that linked Mexican indigenous
communities with social justice activists worldwide. In terms of media
technology, Zapatista videos recorded on VHS tapes were carried out
of the Lacandon jungle to the nearest urban centers and then on to
Mexico City, where US activists picked them up and took them to
Austin, Texas to be digitized and uploaded on computer listservs;
meanwhile Zapatista audio recordings and texts were translated
into multiple languages and disseminated via then-emerging digital
platforms. In terms of cultural message, Subcomandante Marcos, the
main spokesperson of the Zapatistas at the time, used these practical means to issue statements that framed the local struggles of
marginalized Mexican indigenous communities as aligned with other
social justice and identity struggles in the Global North and Global
South (Rodríguez, Kidd, and Stein 2010), proposing himself as standing
in for “every untolerated, oppressed, exploited minority that is … now
beginning to speak” (Subcomandante Marcos 1994).
Through their distinctive use of communications (both technological
and cultural) the Zapatistas served to link social justice collectives and
individuals worldwide into a wave of international solidarity in the
global public sphere, alerting the Mexican government and its army
that the whole world was monitoring human rights abuses against indigenous communities in southern Mexico (Pianta and Marchetti 2007).
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Social justice activists in many countries worldwide came to adopt
Zapatista language, goals, and communication strategies. “Zapatismo”
came for many to represent a new type of social justice activism, based
less on formal institutional structures and more on “participation and
deliberation, collective autonomy, and decentralized power structures”
(Ferron 2012: 157). Marcos’ specific manifesto for the “construction
of a world where many worlds fit” (EZLN 1996) became exemplary
for linking social justice to questions of culture (voice and diversity in
public spheres) and questions of media (the need for inclusive media
infrastructures).
The influence of this exemplar was shown in December 1999 by the
actions of a wide coalition of protesters who met in Seattle to disrupt a
World Trade Organization (WTO) summit. Because the Seattle protests
originated a series of demonstrations against the dominant model of
neoliberal globalization, the movement is sometimes labelled the “anti-
globalization movement,” but they refused that label, as they were not
opposed to globalization, but to specific economic models that spread
inequity worldwide. Learning from the EZLN, this movement insisted on
producing their own media rather than allowing mainstream media to
shape the narrative about their actions. The Seattle protest organizers
set up the first Independent Media Center (Indymedia), and enabled
protesters to produce and edit their own coverage of the protests
by uploading to Indymedia’s web page, which, in turn, incorporated
Open Publishing software made available by media activist Matthew
Arnison from Sydney’s Community Activist Technology group (Arnison
2001; Kidd 2004). This model was replicated during the first decade
of the twenty-first century in hundreds of cities worldwide under the
motto “Don’t hate the media, be the media.”
Even in a world of corporate-owned digital platforms, these visions
from the Lacandon jungle and Seattle still resonate through alternative
models of how social justice activists can appropriate and redesign
media technologies to meet their distinctive information and communication needs (Rodríguez 2001, in press).

13.7.2 Affordances and Constraints: From the Mobile
Phone to Social Media and Beyond
If the circumstances of the Zapatistas’ innovations were exceptional,
broader changes in access to media technologies have been important
too. With the introduction of prepaid accounts, low-cost handsets and
relatively easy connectivity, mobile phone usage has spread across all
social groups, including poor and marginalized populations. Despite
stark inequalities in access, use, literacy, and resources (Donner 2015;
Qiu 2014), much social innovation and activism with mobile phones
has emerged, enabling collective action of all sorts, whether progressive or not. At the same time, the migration of activism to new
digital platforms has encountered new constraints. We must always
remember that the very same communication resources that benefit
movements for social justice and social progress are also benefiting
the movements that oppose them, including forces of right-
wing
extremism and authoritarian populism. Before discussing activism in
more detail, it is important to note also that the affordances of mobile
technologies and social networking platforms enable new kinds of
everyday solidarity in contexts outside of politics. The use of mobile
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phones, the Internet, and social media has been important among
migrants and their dispersed family, cultural, and political networks
(Fortunati, Pertierra, and Vincent 2012). Filipino workers and other
domestic workers (generally women) who spend years away from
their families and communities use mobile phones and social media to
maintain bonds and connection with friends and families (Madianou
and Miller 2012). Chinese migrants who leave rural areas to find work
in cities (Chu et al. 2012) also rely on mobile phones to create a new
“modern” identity, spanning urban and rural settings (Wallis 2013).
Outside the context of migration, diverse communities use mobile
phones to redraw the boundaries between the private and personal
and create “intimate publics” (Hjorth, King, and Kataoka 2014), for
example to mourn or grieve (Cann 2014; Cuminsky and Hjorth 2016).
In the wake of the earthquake and tsunami disaster of March 11, 2011
social media and mobile phones provided new channels for citizens to
witness solidarity and contribute to disaster responses in Japan (Hjorth
and Kim 2011).
One of the earliest places where uses of social media and mobile
phones entered politics was Africa, where mobiles have been used
for sharing information on health (SDG 3), “witnessing” human rights
violations (through the incorporation of cameras into mobile phones),
and citizen journalism, including election monitoring (Ekine 2010).
An instructive case is Ushahidi (meaning “testimony” in Swahili), a
mobile-based platform developed to share information and create
maps to report on postelection violence in Kenya in 2008. In the South
African elections of 2009, political groups and their supporters used
different kinds of mobile software, combining instant messaging and
chat functions to enhance communication (SDG 10). Labor struggles in
Africa have also adopted the Internet and especially the mobile phone,
alongside traditional media, for purposes of mobilization, coordination,
and solidarity, for example the Marikana mine workers in South Africa
(Walton 2014) and the El-Mahalla textile workers in Egypt. Section
13.5.4 discussed parallel developments in Northeast Asia.
Another important affordance of ICTs for social justice struggles is
the ease with which they enable textual and multimedia commentary,
protest, and dissent (SDG 16). Building on the early history of dial-up
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) from the late 1980s to late 1990s (Goggin
and McLelland 2016), the growth of the World Wide Web in the 1990s
saw the emergence of blogs as a flexible and powerful architecture
of connection and commentary (Bruns and Jacobs 2006). In many
countries, blogs enabled writers and activists, audiences and publics
to engage and connect. Although this first attracted attention in the
United States, it quickly became influential among social movements
elsewhere, for example in the Middle East, especially Egypt (el-
Nawaway and Khamis 2015) and Iran (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010).
Blogs provide a way for religious, cultural, political, and linguistic communities to connect across territorial boundaries around religion (the
various Muslim blogospheres: Russell and Echchaibi 2009), gender
rights (Guta and Karolak 2015), health issues, and diasporic and sexual
identities.
But the implications of information and communications technologies
for achieving social justice and democracy are often ambiguous for several reasons. First, patterns of access and use remain very unequal. An
example from the early 2000s comes from two post-Apartheid South
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African social movements, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and
the Anti-Privatization Forum (APF): although they used websites and
email to disseminate information, they needed to limit their mobile
phone use to communications within their organizations. The use more
recently of smartphones to communicate election messaging does not
necessarily transform the public sphere overall or citizens’ opportunities within it (Walton and Donner 2009). The use of different media for
different functions may channel politics and related activity into particular elite domains (policy discussion by experts, for instance), rather
than broadly based public spheres in which wider populations can participate (Wasserman 2007).

13

Second, debate continues about the role of social media platforms
in creating new forms of solidarity and transnational mobilization. Facebook has been associated with various social and political
movements, especially the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2011, as well as
the recent “Women’s March” –a worldwide protest held in January
2017 to protect legislation and policies regarding human rights and
environmental issues. Meanwhile, Twitter –relatively simple in its
design, and without the cross-media integration of Facebook –has
nonetheless helped incubate various initiatives based on “hashtag
publics” (Weller et al. 2013), for example around Iran’s 2009 election
(Mottahedeh 2015), #BlackLivesMatter in the United States, and the
#RhodesMustFall protests in South Africa.
At the same time, however, the infrastructure of social media and
digital platforms remains tightly controlled by their corporate
owners and managers (Andrejevic 2013), rather than by activists.
Technological affordances that are key to solidarity –for example the
hashtag function in Twitter –can be changed overnight by the parent
corporation without consultation or participation of users. It remains
very difficult for users or activists to have systematic input into the
design and governance of commercial social media platforms (Mansell
2012). Social movements and social justice activists have learned that
the potential of digital platforms to enhance their communication capabilities goes hand in hand with increased surveillance of their actions
(Treré 2015). Finally, it is important to remember that the very same
communication resources that benefit movements for social justice
and social progress are also benefiting the movements that oppose
them. We need therefore in reviewing the potential of new media technologies to acknowledge both affordances and constraints, and how
they interact in specific contexts.

13.7.3 One Planet, Many Struggles, Many Media
Contemporary protest movements tend to draw on an “enlarged
media ecology” (Qiu 2008) of old and new media, where traditional
communication channels are mixed with new digital tools of activism.
A variety of media ecologies have proved important in the context of
different struggles for social justice across the world.
The interplay among traditional and digital media reached new heights
as the Arab uprisings of 2010 and 2011 spawned a vibrant scene of
dissident media and culture. The rise of political stand-up comedy was
a hallmark of the uprising: in Bahrain, Syria, and Tunisia digital videos
bore witness to atrocities, mocked dictators, and showcased a variety of
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animation, dance, theatre, and song. The media of artists and activists,
often produced and disseminated under extremely risky conditions, is
an important form of “creative insurgency” (Kraidy 2016). Meanwhile,
media-based activism for gender equality and the empowerment of all
women and girls is also growing worldwide. Through creative media
strategies, advocacy groups have from the 1990s onwards made
remarkable progress in the realm of gender equality from universal
suffrage for women to rights for sexual minorities.
As another example, in the struggle against ISIS, activists have been
running clandestine festivals of short films, shot on mobile phones,
thereby defying local political censorship and moral prohibitions. The
group “Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently” has documented the atrocities of daily life under the Islamic State, propagating these on social
media and connecting with mainstream journalists worldwide.
As these examples also illustrate, care is needed to contextualize the
role of digital platforms in social movements. Digital technologies and
social media platforms rarely drive political actions and protest in
themselves. Social movements’ communication strategies may involve
not only digital technologies but also a wide range of non-digital
media. In the 2013–2016 Gezi Square protests in Turkey, solidarity was
built through a mix of media that combined photocopied zines and
street performance with content shared via social media platforms
(Saybasılı 2014).
A significant new direction in media activism is as a space for political
agency outside the sectarianism that dominates mainstream media
and politics in polarized societies. In Lebanon, activists have mobilized
around issues of environmental justice and the provision of utilities;
the 2015 “You Stink” Movement, which used digital media to mobilize
activism about inadequate removal services for municipal waste, was
a key example of this trend.
Anticorruption campaigning has also harnessed diverse media capabilities. The most dramatic example of using the Internet as an infrastructure of connection to challenge not just corruption, but state
and corporate power more generally, is the work of the activist group
Anonymous with its “denial of service” and other attacks (Coleman
2014) and the whistleblower platform WikiLeaks (Brevini, Hintz, and
McCurdy 2013). One of the largest civil society campaigns in recent
years is the 2011 Indian anticorruption movement triggered by Anna
Hazare’s hunger strike in New Delhi.
In conclusion, all social justice and social progress initiatives depend
on complex media ecologies that offer resources while simultaneously
imposing risks and constraints. Activist individuals and communities,
not technologies, drive social progress, by meeting the specific communication and information needs of each social justice context.

13.7.4 Creative Affordances: The Case of Disability
Movements
An excellent case study of the role that the new affordances of digital
media technology can play is disability. According to the landmark
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WHO 2011 World Report on Disability, more than 1 billion people
in the world experience disability (15 percent of the world’s population), of whom 110–190 million experience very significant disabilities
(SDG 3).
Disability involves a wide range of impairment types from sensory
disabilities to cognitive disabilities and psychosocial conditions.
Prevalence of disability is growing due to population ageing and global
increase in chronic health conditions. Disability is highly correlated
with disadvantage but not “all people with disabilities are equally
disadvantaged” (WHO 2011).
A roadmap for putting disability at the heart of the vision for social
progress was proposed in 2006 by the UN Convention on Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The CRPD has many provisions, which
involve communication and technology rights, since media is pivotal
for achieving human rights in relation to disability. People with disabilities generally experience inferior access to and affordability of media
infrastructures, technologies, content, and participation, especially in
the Global South. At the same time, disability becomes a paradigm case
for rethinking both media and media’s potential contribution to social
progress. Disability is a key part of wider understandings of cultural
and media diversity, but is of particular interest because of disability
struggles’ strong focus on digital technologies and their affordances.
Since the 1970s, the role of media in communicating negative attitudes,
stereotypes, and myths about disability has been critiqued, commencing with the role of advertising in “charity” discourses of disability
and a push towards affirmative images of disability. Although still very
much in the minority, people with disabilities appear as characters of
TV shows, increasingly reported in news, or, on occasion, as media
workers, broadcasters, journalists, and celebrities themselves. However
there remains a hierarchy of what is newsworthy, entertaining, and
shareable, even in digital platforms. Mainstream media industries generally lag behind in offering work opportunities to people with disabilities (SDG 8). Disability still occupies a marginal place on media
professionals’ agendas.
However, in various countries, people with disabilities and their allies
are using digital platforms in distinctive ways: for example, US Deaf
protests in the Gaudallet “Deaf President” campaign; the use of video,
photography, and social media by Bolivian disability activists in March
2016 to demand better social support (Goggin 2016); and British disability movement protests from 2012 against welfare cuts, using blogs,
Facebook, and Twitter. Through social media, blogs, and websites a
wide variety of disability publics have emerged. People with disabilities have also developed their own disability media: dedicated blogs
(Ouch! established by BBC in the UK), disability comedy chatshow
news genres (The Last Leg, Channel 4 in Britain), disability web-based
programs (Gimpgirl), and crowd-funding platforms used to fund investigative journalism or entertainment.
Issues of accessibility to media infrastructures, as well as the potential affordances of these platforms, are particularly salient for people
with disabilities, for example, captioning on TV and radio for the
print handicapped. Despite their long histories, disability media such
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as Braille formats and sign language communication are still given
little recognition in wider society, although there have been concerted
international efforts on some aspects of digital technology (accessible
computers and software, web accessibility, mobile phone accessibility,
“apps” for people with disabilities).
Yet even in areas with the most concentrated effort, such as web
accessibility, the situation remains inequitable: most government
websites across the world have low levels of accessibility compliance,
despite “digital first” government service, welfare, and e-government
policies. The implementation of the CRPD requires widespread accessibility, especially across design of digital technologies, but national
legislatures and media corporations have been slow to act.
The lack of social progress on disability and media is a central issue
for wider social progress. It constrains the possibilities for social and
cultural participation of people with disabilities (SPI “Health and
wellness”). Yet disability has much to teach us about how communication occurs across the world’s population: communication among, with,
and by people with disabilities foregrounds issues of voice (Couldry
2010) and listening (MacNamara 2015): people with disabilities need
access to public spheres where we can all listen not least governments,
corporations, civil society, and a wide range of other organizations and
agents (Goggin 2009). Without that the much-vaunted promises of
new digital technologies are hollow.

13.8

Summary and Recommendations

This chapter has told two stories. On the one hand, the vast and varied
media landscape we have depicted offers a complex set of resources
for daily life and social movements. On the other, this landscape is
marked by processes of power both old and radically new: new
power processes include an emerging logic of data extraction tied to
an imperative of data stimulation via increased message circulation
(Sections 13.3 and 13.6). Through this transformation, unfamiliar forms
of domination and exclusion are emerging, while public discourse
and practices of government are subject to surprising new pressures.
The long history of communications, and specifically media technologies, is now joining up with capitalism‘s development in striking new
ways. The resulting global information environment requires urgent
attention, if our understanding of social progress’ dynamics is not to
be dangerously oversimplified.
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by the recurrent “social imaginary” (Taylor 2003) that sees media
infrastructures as automatically progressive and socially transformative (for critique, see Herman, Hadlaw, and Swiss 2014; Mansell
2012; Mosco 2004). Although people rely on media platforms for
connection and communication, they generally have very little influence over their design and pricing, or the conditions of access, use,
or content production and distribution. Second, there is not one
single space of connection enabled by media, but many such spaces,
and the relations between them are highly uneven: questions of
language and culture, unequal influence over Internet governance,
software localization and technical design, all make the Internet, in
particular, a highly uneven playing field for diverse groups, especially cultural and linguistic minorities. Third, even with access and
more even distribution of opportunities for effective use, it may not
be solidarity and dialogue that are facilitated when people come
together via media (online abuse is also on the rise): the Internet‘s
capacity, in principle, to enable multiple producers of content is not
therefore sufficient. A central issue remains: how to design and sustain online spaces that encourage dialogue, free speech, respectful
cultural exchange, and action for social progress? The governance
of internet infrastructures is crucial in all of this, but itself highly
contested and uneven.

13

In response to these challenges, we recommend that the key measure
of “social progress” in the global policy community (the SPI) be
adjusted to recognize effective media access as a new core component
of social progress:
•

•

While it is important that the SPI under “foundations of well-
being” includes “access to information and communications”
(defined in terms of numbers of internet users, mobile phone
subscriptions, and a Press Freedom Index), this is insufficient: additional measures are needed for the distribution of opportunities
for effective access and use. Such measures would concern not
only access to the technological means to receive information
and content, but also to appropriate pertinent and affordable
technologies. The design of media infrastructures and digital
platforms needs to be pertinent to diverse language communities, individuals with different ability levels, learning styles, and
financial resources.
While it is important that the SPI under “Opportunity” includes
“personal rights” and “tolerance and exclusion,” this is insufficient: communication rights must be added to the basket of
personal rights, taking into account the direct relation between
lack of participation and diversity in the design and governance
of media infrastructures and lack of inclusion and tolerance at a
more general cultural level.
The right to privacy should also be added, including appropriate
regulatory frameworks to protect against surveillance and data
extraction.
In addition, references to “tolerance” elsewhere in the SPI need
to be interpreted to include tolerance in the media (that is, the
absence of hate speech against the LGBTIQ community, women
and girls, ethnic minorities, etc.)

Media are an important resource for movements that promote social
progress, and effective access to media is a necessary component of
social justice (and a too-little recognized component of social progress
itself). By “effective access” we mean that all individuals and communities should be able to use media infrastructures to produce content,
access information and knowledge, and be active participants in the
realms of politics, culture, and governance. Three major factors complicate the picture considerably.

•

First, the distribution of media resources (including traditional media
and digital platforms) is skewed towards the rich and powerful,
and away from the majority of the world’s population, especially
poor, marginalized, and excluded groups. This basic fact is ignored

In addition, we make the following broader recommendations:

•

553
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 16 Sep 2019 at 22:52:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399647.006

554

555

Chapter 13

•

13

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Media and communications infrastructures should be regarded
as a common good, in the same way as other infrastructures
(roads, railways, etc.). The recent wave of privatization and
concentration in the media and information industries should
be reviewed by regulators for its effects on the quality of
media, its diversity, and its ability to meet people’s needs. The
encouragement of subsidy and spaces for nonprofit media
should become an essential component of struggles for social
progress and social justice. If progress is to be made towards
these wider goals, major efforts are needed by civil society,
governments, and international organizations to promote
and sustain media that exist outside of market forces, and
to secure noncommercial financial models for their existence
(e.g. license fees).
Internet governance should not be in the hands of organizations
that make decisions, implement policy, and design online
architectures behind closed doors. Popular participation and
transparency should be the guiding principles that frame internet
governance, policy, and regulatory frameworks.
Equally, processes for the design of digital platforms and other
means of accessing the Internet should recognize and effectively
include representation from the full range of human communities.
Media infrastructures need to work more effectively to facilitate
the content creation by diverse communities. Access to media
infrastructures as consumers, receivers, or audiences of content
and information is not enough; individuals and communities need
access as content creators; issues of language, affordability, user
competencies, and technology design are fundamental.
Core aspects of society such as health care, social services, and
financial services will be increasingly provided over the Internet
in the future, access to digital systems needs to be equally
distributed among populations, and such access should come free
of commercial tracking and surveillance.
With increased state and corporate surveillance, censorship,
and data gathering need to become the focus of extensive civic
debate and regulatory attention.
Sound, independent journalism, especially investigative journalism, is essential to democratic life. Citizens need curated,
credible, verified, and contextualized information to be able to
make reasonable decisions in political, cultural, and social arenas.
Alternative forms of funding investigative journalism therefore
need to compensate for the threat to the commercial newspaper
business model.
Serious attention is needed also on the impact on environmental
sustainability of the waste generated by today’s communication
devices and the vast data-processing infrastructure that supports
their use. This point has not emerged earlier in this chapter, but it
is an unintended long-term side effect of intensified connection
through media (Maxwell and Miller 2012).

In all these and many other respects media and communications flows
and infrastructures are not mere background to social struggles, but
themselves a site of struggle. We must acknowledge the overall lack
of progress in media reform over the past 40 years. Since 1980 when
the NWICO’s MacBride Report was presented by UNESCO, numerous
initiatives have attempted to reform media infrastructures, including
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the World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS), the Free Press
movement in the United States, and the net neutrality and free software international movements. However, international organizations
have not generally pursued such concerns. The international
organizations responsible for proposing media policy (International
Telecommunication Union (ITU); the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN)) have limited their scope to technical matters discussed with little input from civil society or social
movements. A renewed and more inclusive debate on media reform
must be launched.

Action plan
1. To add effective media access (as defined above) as a new core
component of social progress in the SPI, to “ensure affordable, reliable, sustainable, and effective access to communication infrastructure,” while acknowledging the long-
term
environmental waste from IT devices and data processing
infrastructures.
2. To open a public discussion in which matters of inclusion, affordability, and diversity in media take center stage over markets and
profit.
3. To position communication rights as central to official definitions
of Social Progress. Communication rights include the right to be
a content creator; the right to free expression; the right to knowledge and information; and the right to privacy.
4. To pressure international and national regulatory bodies and
policy makers to design and implement processes for civil society
participation in internet and media infrastructures’ governance
and policy. Media infrastructures should be governed by multi-
stakeholder, transparent, and open bodies.
5. To pressure governments, the private sector, and universities to
be accountable for designing media platforms that are accessible
to input from diverse individuals and communities –especially
marginalized communities such as communities of color, gender
minorities, LGBTIQ communities, disabled communities, and communities in the Global South.
6. To push for media and internet regulation that protects users
from state and/or corporate surveillance and data extraction for
control or marketing purposes.
7. To promote media and internet regulatory regimes that forbid
any type of censorship or discrimination based on disability,
gender, sexual orientation, or political, religious, or ethnic
affiliations.
8. To promote the notion that “access” also includes opportunities
for content creation and not the mere technological access to
platforms for media consumption. Media and information literacy,
technical competencies, linguistic diversity, and capacity building
are fundamental elements of access.
9. To re-establish independent, sound journalism as an essential
element of democracy, and for this purpose to explore alternative funding models besides the commercial (innovative forms of
public–private partnership, license fees, etc.).
10. To promote free access to software and free knowledge, as the
commons of humankind.
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Table 13.1 | Toolkit
Goals/values

Policy makers

International
organizations

Corporate media and
tech sector

NGOs

Citizens

Effective access to
communication
infrastructures

Develop regulatory regimes that
guarantee affordability, cultural
inclusion, and linguistic
diversity of media and digital
platforms
Develop regulation that allocates
a significant proportion of
communication resources
(frequencies, budgets, R&D) to
citizens’ media initiatives
Develop regulatory systems to
deal in an environmentally
friendly way with waste from
IT products and their use
Promote net neutrality in national
regulations

Promote the notion that
“Effective access to
media infrastructures”
includes using
technologies to create
and disseminate
content
Monitor media and digital
content for diversity,
inclusivity, and access
Sanction corporate media
and technology
corporations if they
fail to comply

Produce tolerant, inclusive,
and diverse media and
digital content
Design media and digital
platforms that can
be used by citizens
to produce and
disseminate their own
content
Adopt net neutrality

Promote and support
citizens’ media
Promote media
production and
software design
programs in schools
Promote training
in media and
information literacy
and writing code

Develop and support
citizens’ media
(produced by local
communities for
local communities)
Develop and support
school media
Implement citizen-
run media and
information literacy
programs
Demand tolerant,
inclusive, and
diverse media and
digital content
from the private
and public media
sectors
Defend net neutrality

Transparency and
accountability of
media and digital
platforms

Incorporate transparency and
accountability in international
and national legislation/
regulation on media and the
Internet

Organize multistakeholder
international and
regional forums to
discuss the future
of media and digital
platforms

Help subsidize nonprofit
media and digital
platforms

Mobilize civil society to
participate in global
and local discussion
about the future of
media and digital
platforms

Demand inclusion and
voice in global and
local discussions
about the future of
media and digital
communication

Communication rights:
• right to be a content
creator
• right to free expression
• right to knowledge and
information
• right to privacy

Include communication rights as
a fundamental human right in
national legislations
Develop the necessary
regulatory frameworks
for the implementation,
regulation, and vigilance of
communication rights

Include communication
rights in SDGs,
SPI, and any other
similar global
blueprint to assess
progress, wellbeing,
and sustainable
development

Review and adjust
business models for
consistency with
communications rights
Advocate policies,
regulations, and
treaties that advance
communication rights
Produce and disseminate
content that informs
audiences about
communication rights

Raise awareness around
communication
rights among social
justice organizations
and social
movements

Demand communication
rights from national
governments, the
private sector
and international
organizations

Participatory governance
of media infrastructures
and digital platforms

Design media and digital platforms
regulatory regimes that
include effective civil society
participation, and in particular
participation by representatives
of indigenous people and
people with disabilities

Establish a global
international body
responsible for
monitoring and
assessing access,
inclusion, diversity,
and communication
rights in media
infrastructures
Promote the notion that
civil society input
is essential in the
governance of media
and digital platforms
Implement educational
programs for citizens
about media and
internet regulation and
governance

Include civil society
participation in all
aspects of media and
internet governance
(e.g. ICANN, WAN-Ifra)

Promote the notion
that civil society
participation in
media and internet
governance is a right
Implement media and
internet regulation
and governance

Demand the opportunity
to participate in
media and internet
governance
Implement citizen-
run educational
programs about
media and internet
regulation and
governance
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Goals/values

Policy makers

International
organizations

Corporate media and
tech sector

NGOs

Citizens

Participation of civil society
in the design of media
infrastructures and
digital platforms

Budget public funds for inclusive
citizen-led research and
design of digital platforms and
software, where “inclusive”
means including, for example,
women and girls, indigenous
communities, disabled
communities, and linguistic
minorities

Monitor and assess
the cultural
appropriateness and
inclusivity of media,
digital platforms, and
software for diverse
communities
Promote inclusive civil
society participation
and input in the
research and design
of communication
technologies

Establish the necessary
channels to
incorporate inclusive
citizen input into
research and design
of communication
technologies,
especially indigenous
communities, disabled
communities, and
linguistic minorities

Promote research
and design of
communication
technologies in
schools
Promote design of
communication
technologies and
software driven
by the needs of
disadvantaged
communities
and specifically
(a) women and
girls, (b) indigenous
peoples, and
(c) disabled people
Develop and fund
initiatives for
sharing knowledge,
know-how, technical
expertise, and
content between
disadvantaged
communities

Implement inclusive
citizen-run, local
initiatives of
communication
technology research
and design
Demand participation
in corporate
and public
communication
technology research
and design
Promote the use
of open access
software

Protection from
surveillance and data
extraction

Design and implement regulation
that protects citizens from
surveillance and data
extraction by media and
internet corporations,
governments, and security
organizations
Regulate the use of algorithms
for marketing or surveillance
purposes

Promote multistakeholder
regional and
international forums
to address surveillance
and data extraction
Re-position civil society
organizations as
key participants
in regulating the
consequences of
surveillance and data
extraction
Lead a public conversation
about filtering and
predictive algorithms

Review and adjust
business models for
consistency with rights
of privacy and data
protection
Advocate policies,
regulations, and
treaties that advance
rights of privacy and
data protection
Develop transparent and
accessible conventions
for disclosing
sponsorship, and
describing the use of
predictive algorithms

Promote a public
conversation on
surveillance and
data extraction as
threats to privacy
Expose unlawful
government
surveillance
activities
Support the design and
distribution of ad
blockers and tracker
visualization tools

Demand the right
to privacy and
protection against
data extraction
by corporate or
government entities
Demand transparency
and accountability
of data collection,
filtering and the
use of predictive
algorithms

Media infrastructures and
digital platforms free
from censorship

Develop regulatory regimes that
demand transparency and
accountability of content
filtering mechanisms
Develop legislation that
protects whistleblowers and
investigative journalists
Include the social responsibility of
media and digital platforms as
a key element of international
and national media and
internet legislation

Monitor the transparency
of content filtering
mechanisms used
by corporate and
government media
and digital platforms
Promote the need
for investigative
journalism as an
essential component
of democratic life

Commit to supporting
independent
investigative
journalism as the
social responsibility
of media and digital
platforms

Fund civil society
initiatives to monitor
and catalogue
content removal in
digital platforms and
social media
Support independent
investigative
journalism initiatives
(in universities,
foundations, or
government-
sponsored
organizations)

Demand access to
knowledge and
information
Support investigative
journalism as an
essential element of
democratic societies
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Table 13.1 | (continued)
Goals/values

Policy makers

International
organizations

Corporate media and
tech sector

NGOs

Citizens

Media and information
literacy

Promote the inclusion of media
and information literacy as a
core element in educational
curricula

In collaboration with
NGOs, civil society,
and citizens’ media,
implement media and
information literacy
initiatives at the
local level, especially
targeting children
and youth, disabled
communities, ethnic
minorities, and other
vulnerable populations

Develop free and
accessible media
and information
literacy initiatives in
collaboration with
NGOs and citizens

Fund/sponsor media and
information literacy
initiatives developed
by international
organizations, NGOs,
civil society, and
citizens’ media
Promote public
conversation about
the improvement
of media and
information literacy

Develop local initiatives
of media and
information
literacy –linked
e.g. to schools,
universities,
community
organizations, and
local citizens’ media

Linguistic diversity

Implement policies that mandate
subtitles and translation
Design regulatory regimes that
mandate the production of
media content and software
for linguistic minorities and
disabled communities
Include indigenous people and
people with disabilities in
the formulation of media and
internet regulatory regimes

Coordinate and support
local initiatives for
linguistic diversity
Enable global visibility of
linguistic diversity

Produce content in various
languages, including
indigenous languages
Design communication
technologies and
software appropriate
and accessible to
diverse linguistic
communities and
disabled communities

Promote alliances
and collaboration
between media
and digital
communication
NGOs and
indigenous
NGOs and social
movements
Mobilize civil society and
social movements
to demand linguistic
plurality in media
infrastructures

Demand media content
available in local
languages
Demand media
content and
digital platforms
tailored to disabled
communities

Human knowledge as
commons, instead of
commodities

Balance intellectual property rights
with notions of information
and knowledge as the
commons of humankind, and
the value of communication
and dialogue

Pressure trade agreement
negotiations to
balance intellectual
property protections
with the rights to
free knowledge and
information
Promote free culture and
free/libre/open source
software

Recognize the limits to
proprietary claims
over information,
expression, and
innovation
Acknowledge the
importance for
social progress of
the availability of
nonproprietary
information,
expression, and
innovation
Advocate policies,
regulations, and
treaties that advance
a global knowledge
commons

Pressure schools to
embrace free/
libre/open source
software in the
classroom

Demand access to
knowledge and
information as a
right, not a privilege

13

Note: we have allocated the tasks in the toolkit matrix to the actor who should have the main responsibility for each task, however, various tasks should be developed by multistakeholder bodies.
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